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OVERVIEW

Altruistic investment occurs when individuals make gifts and
donations, and when they engage in collective activities funded by
gifts and donations for the direct benefit of others, without regard
to immediate personal profit in the more classic sense of the
word.1 Charitable contributions and charitable organizations, for
example, embody the notion of altruistic investment. Altruistic
organizations are referred to by many names, including "nonprofit
organizations," "charities," and "nongovernmental organizations."
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. B.S.,J.D., LL.M. University of Florida. ProfessorJones is a member of the Florida Bar
and is former Chair of the Tax Section, National Association of College and University
Attorneys.
This Article originated as a paper I was invited to present at the 2001 International Conference on Volunteering, Beijing China, November 6-9, 2001. Unfortunately, the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001 resulted in the postponement of that conference, and I was
unable to attend when the conference re-convened the following spring. Thanks to Professor Ron Brand (University of Pittsburgh) for encouraging me to think globally, Professor
Pat Chew (University of Pittsburgh) for her comments and insights, and Junekwang Bae
(University of Pittsburgh, Class of 2003) for his indispensable research assistance.
1. The term "altruistic investment" is derived primarily from the writings of four
authors. First, Professor Hansman's seminal articles take an economic, rational person view
of the reasons why people make gifts and donations to charities. See Henry B. Hansman,
The Rationalefor ExemptingNonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 835
(1981); Henry B. Hansman, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835 (1980). In
general, Hansman views a person who makes a donation or otherwise patronizes a nonprofit organization as actually purchasing something - usually a public good - that is not
reliably available from the normal market place. Professor Atkinson takes a more philosophical view and thinks that gifts and donations, and organizations typically referred to as
charitable, are made and exist, respectively, as expressions of individual and collective
altruism, though he acknowledges that individuals and collectives receive something other
than classic "profit" for their activities. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,
31 B.C. L. REv. 501 (1990). Professors Colombo and Hall's preferred definition of a charitable organization is one whose income is derived primarily from persons who receive no
immediate financial quid pro quo from their transfer of wealth, although they too acknowledge that donors receive some other form of benefit by funding such organizations. John
D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION (1995). These diverging but
still related views can be synthesized into the conclusion that a donor is actually making an
investment - seeking a yield - whether we take an economic view or a view based on the
philosophy of "good works."
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The societal sector comprised of altruistic investors and organizations is referred to by various names including "civil society," "third
2
sector" and "independent sector."
Altruism constitutes an investment because it is motivated by the
3
hope of profit, though not in the classical sense of the word. It is
distinguishable from economic investment because it is explicitly
conditioned upon a mutually beneficial result as between investor
and recipient. Economic investment is not so necessarily conditioned, though mutual benefit is presumed, given equal bargaining
strength and informational access. 4 A creditor might gladly lend
money at usurious rates provided he is reasonably assured of the
debtor's credit-worthiness. Altruistic investment depends on the
recipient's increased well-being and does not seek to profit at
another's expense. Unlike economic investment, altruistic investment does not exploit asymmetrical differences in bargaining
strength and access to information to the detriment of the weaker
party. In the most rudimentary sense, for example, when a pedestrian stops and gives spare change to a panhandler she does so
because giving makes her feel better, perhaps alleviating her guilt
for enjoying a relatively privileged existence. She profits from her
generosity, but only'if the recipient's well-being improves. This
rather cynical view-that altruism is ultimately a self-serving behavior-is debatable, and this Article does not attempt to resolve the
debate. 5 Instead, this Article accepts the cynical view because it
speaks in the language that resonates most in a world increasingly
characterized by capitalist motivations. Indeed, self-enhancing
economic advancement is the primary motivator of the evolving
relationship between China and the United States. Altruistic
investment, conceptualized as a self-serving activity, is therefore not
inconsistent with the motivations for better relations between both
countries.
Capitalist societies, or societies in transition to market capitalism,
should encourage altruistic investment. Doing so assists in the
2. Penina Kessler Lieber, An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PIrr. L. REv. 731, 738-40
(2001) (discussing the interchangeability, or lack thereof, of terms such as "civil society,
"independent sector" "third sector" "nongovernmental" and "nonprofit").
3. For a discussion of the philosophical view that altruism is ultimately a self-serving
activity, see Atkinson, supra note 1, at 526-33.
4. The classic tax definition of "fair market value," for example, is "the price at which
property or the right to use property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy, sell, or transfer property or the
right to use property, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4958-4T(b) (1) (i) (2002).
5. See supra note 3.
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development and maintenance of the capitalist system. 6 The market economy is entirely amoral, though it may be the best way to
provide for social welfare and increase the quality of life. Market
economies provide goods and services only to those able to pay.
Those unable to pay are simply ignored. Discontent is inevitable in
this winner takes all system. Discontent may perpetuate healthy
competition, or it may result in resistance or revolution. Government and business prefer competition even while simultaneously
recognizing that competition necessarily creates losers and provokes discontent; thus, governments often maintain social welfare
programs to negate the discontent that losers in a market economy
inevitably experience-a discontent that could fuel revolution if
not eliminated or minimized. Governments' social welfare programs cannot be too successful though, because such programs
impose a drag on the emerging or mature market economy and
7
may potentially displace market economy motivations.
Traditional Chinese socialism completely displaced market economy motivations. Instead, the State served as the exclusive and
omnipotent provider of human needs and definer of human preferences. Altruistic investment became irrelevant as a result. When
government withdraws from its omnipotent role and allows the
market economy to grow, altruistic investment again becomes relevant. In short, altruistic investment adds a level of morality to a
market society that is essentially amoral.8 Altruistic investment rescues those the market economy leaves behind. Social order, upon
which the market economy depends, increases and the threat of
political revolution decreases. It is therefore in the government's
interest to encourage altruistic investment.
6. "Charities are an important source of humanitarian relief and development aid in
an increasingly international community." Joannie Change et al., Cross-BorderCharitableGiving, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 563 (1997).
7. Indeed, there is recent evidence of this phenomenon in China:
Economic growth from the non-state sector is merely offset by losses in the state
sector, as gains produced by the non-state sphere and deposited as household
savings into state banks are turned into unrecoverable bank loans used by the
government to salvage decrepit enterprises .... Continued subsidization of too
many state firms [which subsidization is deemed necessary for the state to provide
employment and social welfare benefits to a huge portion of the population] has
meant the continuation of political, rather than commercially-based, provisions of
capital, which has in turn meant too little, if any, bankruptcy-induced exit for
economically insolvent enterprises.
Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on Privatization:Chinese Privatization:Between Plan and Market, 63
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 15-16 (2000).

8. Change, supra note 6, at 567 (noting that "voluntarism and philanthropy helps
create a more ethical society").
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Economic transition is historically associated with political
upheaval or reform 9 and that association would likely prevail in
China if the dominant transition approach were applied. For this
reason, and because transition holds the hope of a vast new consumer market, the United States is both encouraging and assisting
China's transition process. 10 China is no doubt aware of the U.S.
hope for political change and is determined to resist that change
while also succeeding in its quest for a market economy. It knows
that social discontent usually results from the government's withdrawal from its role as omnipotent provider and that discontent
provokes political challenges.' 'Although political challenges may
result in reform, it is just as likely to provoke a backlash resulting in
the imposition of even more stringent governmental control.
China is therefore implementing a new approach to transition in
an effort to avoid political challenges without having to re-impose
governmental control. Re-imposing government control would
jeopardize its economic transition by provoking trade sanctions
from other economic powers. Even this new approach though will
nonetheless require the government's withdrawal from the role of
omnipotent provider.
9. "Rapid transition from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy invariably produces dislocation and social stress. When these reach extremes, national leaders
must retrench and slow down the reform process." David Blumental, "Reform or Opening"?
Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprisesand WTO Accession - The Dilemma of Applying GAiT to
Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 201 (1998).
10. America's policy of economic engagement with China rests on a belief that
the transition to a free market economy and the development of the rule of law in
China's business sector would likely lead to more political and social openness
and even democracy. This belief, along with the desire to expand American commercial interests, drove U.S. support for China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Many also believe that a more prosperous China will be a
more peaceful country, especially if it is fully integrated into the Pacific and world
economies.
U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

(2002), available at http://www.uscc.gov/excsum02.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
11. The pattern of transition and retrenchment followed by transition holds true in
China.
One can summarize the evolution of Chinese socialism as a series of vacillations.
Total collectivization through people's communes, and an unrealistic 'Great Leap
Forward' in the 1950's followed by some liberalization in the early 1960's, then by
the fanatical Cultural Revolution in 1966. Less dramatic vacillations followed in
the 1970's. The turn towards a more radical reform was taken in 1978, with a
specific mixture of an increasingly strong private-sector co-existing with a traditional state sector, increasing autonomy to the provinces, macro-economic regulation replacing planning, and all this topped by unflinching political control of
the party.
MARIE LAVIGNE,

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION: FROM SOCIALIST ECONOMY TO MARKET

ECONOMY 27-28 (1995).
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Instead of applying the "big bang" method, where government
suddenly withdraws the social safety net to which citizens in socialist systems are accustomed, 12 China has adopted a gradualist
method. 13 The Chinese government is withdrawing slowly from its
role as social welfare provider because it has determined that a
slower pace will make economic suffering and the expected political challenge less likely. 14 The slow pace may further the Chinese
government's political goals, but it is creating resentment among
foreign trading partners upon whom China depends for a successful transition. 15 In particular, China has transformed itself into a
huge exporter, while maintaining its status as a relatively small
importer. The U.S. trade deficit with respect to China has
increased from $11.5 million to nearly $87 billion during the past
twelve years. 16 Some in the United States view China's slow with12. For a discussion of the "big bang" versus gradualist approach in Central and Eastern European countries that have undergone transition, see id. at 118-25.
13. The fundamental approach of the leadership under Deng has been to introduce new policies experimentally, then to broaden their application, and to
adjust them - repeatedly, if necessary - to take account of changing realities or
perceptions of reality, and to cope with new problems and unanticipated consequences of policy changes as they arise.
A. Doak Barnett, China'sModernization: Development and Reform in the 1980's, inJoNT ECON.
COMM., 99TH CONG., 1 CHINA'S ECONOMY LOOKS TOWARD THE YEAR 2000, S. PRT. 99-149
(Joint Comm. Print 1986).
14. The Russian experience of privatization, for example, represents the more
dominant and more favored approach to privatization - certainly from the point
of view of the West and its advisers - and is characterized by immediate privatization of the state sector, including the swift and unequivocal transfer of assets from
the publicly owned state enterprises to private hands. On the other hand, "privatization with Chinese characteristics" emphasizes not the immediate privatization
of the state sector but rather the retention of the state sector with concomitant
creation of a parallel non-state sector designed to supplement the state sector and
to serve as a social "shock absorber" in the event that the state sector itself is to be
eventually "privatized."
Cao, supra note 7, at 13-14.
15. Wayne M. Morrison, CHINA'S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 1 (Congressional Research
Service Issue Brief, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/980717CRSEconomic_
Conditions.htm (last visitedJan. 15, 2004) (noting that trade barriers "have been the cause
of growing tensions with various trading partners, especially the United States"); see also A.
DoAK BARNE-r,

CHINA'S ECONOMY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 261-62 (noting that Chinese

efforts to increase exports, while resisting increased imports, will create "frictions in relations between the industrial powers and the Chinese.").
16. U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: CHAPTER 2, at 2
(2002), available at http://www.uscc.gov/ch2_02.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004); see also
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: CHINA 11 (2002). The U.S.-China trade

deficit is larger than any other U.S. deficit. Id. at 3. The present trade deficit is even more
starting when one considers that the 1973 export-import ratio was approximately 11:1 in
the United States' favor. By 1975 the ratio had dropped to 2:1 primarily because China
began reducing its agricultural imports from the United States, while the United States
began importing other goods from China. ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, CHINA'S ECONOMIC
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drawal of government control and continued subsidization of its
domestic market as unjustifiable protectionism that is inconsistent
with China's recent admission into the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Indeed, China's accession agreement with the WTO mandates an acceleration of the transition process as well as the government's withdrawal from its role as omnipotent social welfare
provider.' 7 The maintenance of what are viewed as protectionist
measures threatens to place China in violation of its WTO obligations. Altruistic investment directed towards alleviating the transitional economic pain and suffering could serve as a substitute for
China's use of protectionist measures. Such investment could
remove the incentives for political challenge and the Chinese government could hasten its withdrawal as social welfare provider,
thereby lessening the frustrations of other economic powers.
Altruistic investment would therefore be in the best interest of all
concerned.
One of the biggest threats to successful transition is social displacement-job loss and the consequences thereof.'8 The pain and
shock of widespread social displacement in any transitioning society will discourage those directly affected and their government
from undertaking or hastening transition, but altruistic investment
can help lessen the shock suffered by those who are most immediately affected by transition. In China, such investment will
decrease the inevitable discontent that would otherwise fuel a
retrenchment of the market economy or threaten the government's monopoly on power.
From the U.S. viewpoint, altruistic investment may therefore
have both good and bad consequences. To the extent altruistic
investment helps to ensure transition will succeed, it is consistent
with U.S. goals. Its return to U.S. investors, admittedly obscure and
uncertain, is both financial-the creation of a new consumer
base-and geopolitical-the lessening of international tensions
REVOLUTION 269 (1977). But even as late as 1979, the trade imbalance between the United
States and China was about $1.2 million in the U.S.'s favor. BARNETr, supra note 15, at 597.
17. Protocol on The Accession of the People's Republic of China (Nov. 10, 2001).
18. "China's INTO accession may exacerbate economic and social strains and lead to
further social unrest, political instability, and an economic downtown, with an uncertain
outcome for U.S. - China relations." U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA: CHAPTER

3, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.uscc.gov/ch3_02.htm

(last visited Jan. 15, 2004); see also id. at 6 (noting that some experts believe that China's
economy is heading for "stagnation or collapse," in part because of the "lack of a social
safety net to support the high levels of unemployed workers and the rise in large-scale
worker protests").
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that may cause costly conflicts between countries. Altruistic investment is inconsistent with U.S. goals, however, to the extent that
investment decreases challenges to China's government. Thus, the
United States may have logical reasons for discouraging altruistic
investment in China, but a closer analysis reveals that the better
course would be to encourage altruistic investment even though it
may strengthen the present Chinese government.' 9 Despite the
benefits from altruistic investment, China may also have logical reasons to discourage altruistic investment, particularly from U.S.
sources. U.S. altruistic investors invariably adhere to democratic
ideals relating to the diffusion of societal power, freedom of
speech, association and belief. A Western-style independent sector
usually criticizes, competes with and offers alternative goals and
methods from those offered by the government. 20 Because the
Chinese government abhors political competition such as might be
encouraged by Western altruistic investors, it should have reason to
discourage altruistic investment at least from U.S. sources.
The foregoing analysis may explain why the United States and
China have given scant attention to altruistic investment in China
even as they are actively encouraging economic investment and
transition in China. A closer analysis, however, shows that altruistic
investment is probably a no-lose proposition for both countries. It
can help achieve both countries' mutually shared goals without
increasing the potential that negative consequences, from either
country's viewpoint, will result. This Article suggests that the WTO
adopt efforts that would encourage altruistic investment in transition economies, and that the United States and China support
those efforts. Whether altruistic investment will strengthen or chal19. The theory of this article is that China will more likely succeed as a capitalist state
with the encouragement of altruistic investment. Some observers, however, do not think
economic success without poltical reform is such a good idea. "If China becomes rich but
not free, the United States may face a wealthy, powerful nation that could be hostile toward
our democratic values, to us, and in direct competition with us for influence in Asia." U.S.
- CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 2.
20. Western definitions of the term "NGO" tend to emphasize the private roots
of social organizations, juxtaposing them against official government agencies.
The American definition, in particular, draws heavily on the image of American
nonprofit organizations as privately constituted, privately funded, independently
operated organizations established by individual citizens who are united by a common vision of the collective good. Such a definition accords a grass-roots connotation to the term and envisions a clear delineation between governmental actors
and the nonprofit sector. It also parallels Western theories of civil society, which
tend to portray social organizations as alternate centers of political power whose
presence helps neutralize the danger of excessive state authority.
C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Rolefor Nongovernmental Organizations,25 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 363 (2000).
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lenge the Chinese government seems irrelevant because it will not
change the likelihood of either outcome occurring. Altruistic
investment can only help, not hurt, the United States, so both
21
countries should do more to encourage it in China.
Motivating people to make gifts and donations, and to engage in
collective "good works," however, requires more than the hope of
good feeling. This is particularly so when the immediate recipient
of such altruism is too far away for the investor to really know its
effect. Impersonal altruistic investment occurs when individuals
make gifts and donations to individuals they never see or to overseas charities. Such investment increases when an immediate and
easily discernable financial return results. Governments in many
market economies therefore attempt to make altruistic investment
competitive with other investment sources by providing a financial
return on altruistic investment through their tax laws. 22 This seems
necessary because the yield from altruistic investment is obscure to
the investor, particularly when that investment is made for the benefit of distant or unknown recipients. The yield may not come
about for years and when it does, the investor may not even know.
A tax benefit decreases the uncertainty that discourage altruistic
investment. A charitable contribution generates an immediate tax
deduction while collective charitable activity is presumptively tax21. It would be wrong to leave the impression that China is invariably and exclusively
a welfare recipient in the world community. To the contrary, China has also engaged in
what might be viewed as international altruistic investment:
China became a significant aid donor itself in the 1950's and, in fact, from 1956
was a net capital exporter [of altruistic investment].... During 1950-64 China's
deliveries on the credits and grants extended during those years totaled $1.205
billion. Most went to other Communist nations (especially North Korea and
North Vietnam, which, it is estimated together received $1.065 billion,) but starting in 1956 the Chinese also began giving aid to non-Communist developing
natons.
BARNETT, supra note 15, at 215.
22. Professor Infanti divides the world's tax laws into eight different categoriesincluding a category for transition economies-and describes the tax laws pertaining to
altruistic investment in each of those categories. Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination:On Adopting a ComparativeApproach to Reforming the U.S. InternationalTax Regime, 35
VAND.J. TRANs. L. 1105, 1159-1223 (2002).
Because charitable giving is the lifeblood of civil society, the question of tax treatment goes to the heart of the sector's sustainability. Without adequate tax incentives, it is unrealistic to assume that charitable dollars from individual donors,
private foundations and/or corporate philanthropic programs will continue to
generate enough funds to support the vast needs of newly independent or third
world nations. Even though an increasing number of multinational corporations
are now internationalizing their "corporate citizenship" activities, many companies still experience discomfort at the prospect of pouring corporate dollars into
foreign communities without assurances of adequate accountability and without
beneficial tax treatment.
Lieber, supra note 2, at 741.
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exempt. Tax laws thus provide a more direct yield that motivates,
at least in part, altruistic investment.
This Article discusses the positive role of altruistic investment in
any transition economy by making specific reference to altruistic
investment in the Chinese economic transition. The Article discusses the social welfare hardships arising from the transition process and then discusses the U.S. and Chinese tax incentives and
barriers to altruistic investment that would lessen that hardship.
After that, the Article discusses the reasons why both countries
might prefer to retain those barriers. Finally, the Article concludes
that altruistic investment has more positive then negative consequences and makes a simple proposal to stimulate altruistic investment in China in a manner that would assist the transition process
without sacrificing either country's mutually exclusive goals. The
proposal, that the WTO recognize, encourage, and integrate altruistic investment through international tax policy, is useful not only
in China but in other developing or economically reforming
countries.
II.

THE ROLE OF ALTRUISTIC INVESTMENT IN A
TRANSITION ECONOMY

International altruistic investment can significantly further the
immediate economic goal sought by China and the United States.
That goal is the successful transition to a market economy. Both
countries pursue this goal only through international economic
investment while ignoring the role international altruistic investment may play in achieving transition and its accompanying
consequences.
Granted, the two countries have mutually exclusive political
goals. China seeks not only to fuel economic growth, necessary to
23
feed and provide other life necessities for its huge population,
but also to fund its goal of becoming a major world power without
altering its political system. 24 The United States wants not only to
gain access to a huge consumer population, but also hopes that a
transition to a market economy will lead to a democratic political
system in China. 25 Altruistic investment is conducive to both coun23. China's population is estimated at 1.3 billion. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra
note 16, at 3.
24. U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: CHAPTER 1, at 1
(2002), available at http://www.uscc.gov/chl_02.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).

25.

Id.
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tries' immediate goal of successful transition. In short, gifts, donations, and charitable activities originating from abroad decrease
the economic pain and shock suffered domestically by those who
undertake and are most directly affected by the transition from a
socialist to a market economy. By doing so, international altruistic
investment accelerates and increases the chances that a market
economy will succeed, rather than be defeated by reactionary
forces. Altruistic investment might also bring with it Western ideas
of democracy, but at the same time it will lessen or eliminate economic motivations to challenge the incumbent political system.
The impact on the two countries' differing political goals strengthening (China's goal) or weakening (the United States'
goal) the Chinese government - should therefore be neutral. That
is, altruistic investment will expose Chinese citizens to democratic
ideals but those same citizens'growing prosperity made possible by
altruistic investment will decrease social discontent and the motivations to mount political challenges. The evident task, one undertaken in Section V, is to determine and then deconstruct the
precise reasons for the neglect and discouragement of altruistic
investment. After doing so, readers should conclude that the
apparent disdain for international altruistic investment is not simply an anachronistic relic of the Cold War. There are logical reasons why both governments would actually want to discourage
international altruistic investment, even as one country is required
to accept immediate hardship for the sake of future economic gain
beneficial to both countries. The larger issue is whether those reasons are of sufficient import to forego the benefits that arise from
such investment. That question, too, is thoroughly addressed in
Section V. In this section, I simply make the generic case that
international altruism can effectively assist in the transition to a
market economy and thus further the primary goals of both the
United States and China.
As discussed in further detail below, the United States and China
have embarked upon an active, ongoing policy of economic
engagement characterized primarily by China's transition to a
"socialist market economy." 26 The success of that policy depends,
26. One definition of "market socialism" is an economic system in which:
(1) all enterprises and means of production are publicly owned; (2) planners'
preferences prevail; but (3) the actual allocation of resources is still left to the
price system so that planners' decisions concerning the resource-allocation mix
are implemented through the market mechanism; and (4) this implementation is
still based on material incentives and on highly differentiated rewards.
ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 38.
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among other things, on the government and populace of China
conceding to the State's withdrawal from ownership of wealth producing activities. A generic disincentive to that concession, however, is the loss of assurance to each individual of equal
distribution of wealth throughout society, such that each person is
guaranteed an absolute right to a certain level of subsistence. The
sudden or even gradual withdrawal of the omnipotent social safety
net exposes all members of society to the risk of sub-minimal subsistence and therefore discourages the adoption of a market economy.27 In fact, the emergence of a market economy that motivates
participants with the hope of profit and wealth necessarily presup28
poses both income inequality and a certain level of poverty.
When a society moves beyond a certain floor representing mere
subsistence, wealth and poverty become mutually dependent concepts. One person cannot be wealthy unless another is poor. To
the extent there are gradations of wealth, there is bound to be one
status of absolute poverty. A transition to a market economy therefore requires individuals to assume the risk of absolute or relative
poverty, knowing that some among them will suffer that fate but
not knowing who among them will suffer. Rawlsian philosophy
posits that it is neither moral nor rational that individuals would
The earliest acceptance of market socialism in China is traced to a July 1978 speech
given by Hu Chio-mu, Director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to the State
Council. BARNETT, supra note 15, at 37. The period of transition in China between 1978
and 2002, roughly, probably best exemplifies the academic definition of market socialism.
The State still maintained ownership over the means of production, but China sought to
"(1) improve planning, (2) relate production decisions to real costs, prices, and other market factors, (3) give professionals at the enterprise level more decision-making authority,
and (4) strengthen incentive systems." Id. at 203. More recently, when China gained admission to the World Trade Organization, it essentially agreed to private ownership of enterprises and the means of production. See Raj Bhala, Enter The Dragon: An Essay on China's
WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INr'L. L. REv. 1469 (2000). Doing so, of course, will create
further variance between the academic and Chinese manifestation of market socialism. On
the other hand, China's constitution continues to proclaim that "the whole people" own
the means of production so perhaps there shall be no variance. XIANFA [Constitution] ch.
I, art. 6 (P.R.C.) (1988) [hereinafter CHINESE CONST.]. It also remains to be seen whether
preferences will continue to be defined exclusively by the State, rather than by individual
consumers. This Article later argues that one reason why China neglects or even disdains
altruistic investment is because such investment is purely a matter of individualism - consumer rather than state preference.
27. The incidence of poverty usually increases sharply during the first ten years of
economic transition. THE WORLD BANK, TRANSITION: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 8 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/02/
09/000094946_02012504134954/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2004).
28. Various reports place the number of Chinese living in poverty (i.e., on less than
$1.00 per day) at approximately 100 million. See, e.g., U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 14.
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actually agree beforehand to accept such risks, particularly when
there is no method by which to predict the outcome. Hence, there
is a natural disincentive to adopt a market economy. Individuals
would rather accept the safe "known" than embark upon the dangerous "unknown" even assuming that the unknown might eventu29
ally be better for everybody.
When the State withdraws the social safety net, according to the
research on transition economies, an immediate and drastic drop
in living standards results, followed by a gradual, less drastic recovery. Individuals suffer real personal economic hardship while waiting for the new market economy to alleviate their social and
economic displacement. If the resulting decrease in living standards were depicted as points on an xy-plane and a line drawn
from point to point, there would appear a 'J," leaning away from
the point of origin, with the points at earlier moments representing the drastic drop in living standards and the points at later times
representing a more gradual recovery and increase in living standards.3 0 Recovery may take years, even spanning the life of a generation. The transition to a market economy will therefore be
delayed, resisted or thwarted altogether to the extent that personal
hardship is severe and pervasive throughout society and suffering
persons rebel. 31 Indeed, for a market economy to take hold, the
29. There are generally three constituencies affected by transition: (1) state sector
workers, (2) party insiders, and (3) new investors. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at xxiii.
The first two groups have the most to lose and therefore oppose transition entirely or favor
only partial transition because in either case complete transition holds the greatest risk of
loss. Id.
30. The fall in growth is initially dominated by the drag of old enterprises, which
leads to a period of decline. With time, if the business environment favors production and innovation rather than rent seeking, restructured and new enterprises gain the critical mass to overcome the negative effects of old enterprises,
leading to recovery and economic growth.
Id. at xvi (plotting the points of transition on an xy plane).
31. Today, the "Great Leap" is viewed, even in China, as a disastrous period of economic transition. This disastrous period of transition resulted in such great and widespread food shortages, famine, job loss, and production loss that it precipitated a severe
retrenchment and the reinvigoration of political ideology, ultimately embodied in the
short-lived, but economically debilitating Cultural Revolution. See Zhenmin Wang, The
Developing Rule of Law in China, HARV. AsiA QUARTERLY, Autumn 2000, available at http://
www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/200004/0004a007.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) ("no
natural or man-made disaster could rival the damage suffered by China from the 'Great
Leap Forward' and the Cultural Revolution."); ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 90-91, 202-05.
The Great Leap occurred during the period from 1958-1960 and sought to transform
China into an industrial power within just two years. Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., China: Economic Policy and Economic Results, 1949-71, in JOINT ECON. COMM., 92ND CONG., PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN ECONOMIC AsSESSMENT 20-22 Uoint Comm. Print 1972). The Cul-

tural Revolution took place from 1966-69. Id. at 25-31.
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present generation must be willing to suffer the hardship of the
State's withdrawal of its ironclad safety net. The single reward is
that a few within the present generation and more in subsequent
generations might benefit to a degree greater than that which can
be expected if the first generation does not undertake the immediate hardship. Those in any present generation should be expected
to strive for the most immediate personal reward and conversely,
strenuously avoid personal hardship. 32 Yet in the midst of a transition economy, particularly during its early stages, personal reward
is distant while personal hardship is immediately present.
It is precisely in those early stages, which might last for any number of years, that altruistic investment can encourage the individual
behavior, specifically the acceptance of State withdrawal from the
ownership of wealth, necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of the
emergence and dominance of the market economy. A less rudimentary, but equally precise definition of altruistic investment, is
the transfer of value without the immediate receipt of equal or
greater value in return, for the purpose of satisfying the recipient's
immediate need and the donor's future desire. Note that altruistic
investment seeks to satisfy the recipient's immediate need, but
yields no immediate return benefit to the donor. Because this article assumes that real altruism does not exist, it must further
assume that altruistic investment necessarily depends on the expectation of return benefit. The return benefit is yielded later rather
than sooner, hence the inclusion of the word "investment." The
satisfaction of the recipient's immediate need, as well as the
donor's future desire, is therefore an inherent component of altruistic investment. An eventual, if not immediate yield is a necessary
precondition to a donor's undertaking of an activity-the making
of a gift or donation-that would otherwise be characterized as
contrary to her self-interest. The investment component, the
future yield, is necessary to induce the donor to sacrifice a more
immediate and direct opportunity for self-serving consumption in
favor of the recipient's immediate need. Altruistic investment can
further transition in this manner. The investor, by making gifts
and donations and engaging in nonprofit activity, can address or
reduce the recipient's hardship resulting from the transition process. The reduction of the recipient's hardship reduces the recipient's incentive to resist the transition and results in a valuable yield
to the investor who benefits from the market economy. In short,
32. Severe unchecked hardship is likely to lead to the creation of interest groups that
will act in opposition to the transition. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at 16.
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altruistic investment helps all parties affected by transition from a
welfare to a market economy. Altruistic investment helps those
recipients directly and immediately affected by the transition as
well as those who will benefit, immediately and in the future, from
the transition.
China may achieve the broader goal shared by the United
States-encouraging directly affected individuals to concede and
hasten the withdrawal of the State's guarantee of equal and no less
than minimal wealth distribution-by alleviating affected individuals' immediate deprivation. "Re-employment centers," which are
similar to, but more extensive in operation than U.S. unemployment offices, are one method by which the Chinese State provides
relief for individuals adversely affected by the transition process. 33
Re-employment centers, though, are merely a form of continued
state intervention and welfare, but on a much larger scale than is
practiced in the West. State welfare, of course, is a compulsory
means by which individuals who benefit from a market economy
assist those who suffer in such an economy, and is normal even in a
mature market economy. While eschewing direct ownership, the
State maintains a certain lien on private wealth, thereby reserving a
right of redistribution in favor of the relative few who suffer chronically under a system of unequal wealth distribution. Recall, however, that the ultimate goal is to stimulate the market economy.
Ideally, market economies and welfare economies are mutually
exclusive. Both cannot exist simultaneously because the former
encourages production and supply of goods via the hope of profit
(i.e., only in response to paying customers), and the latter elimi33. The significant difference between "re-employment centers" and American unemployment offices is that the cost for maintaining and operating the "re-employment center"
is imposed directly on each state-owned enterprise. See GUOJING MAO, NOTICE REGARDING
THE PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE "INVESTIGATIVE REPORT [OF] SHANGHAI'S EXPERIENCES IN CARRYING OUT RE-EMPLOYMENT PROJECTS AND ESTABLISHING RE-EMPLOYMENT SER-

the State Econ. and Trade Comm'n
[P.R.C.], No. 549, 1997), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw68.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). The State-owned enterprise is required to pay the salary of the reemployment center staff. Id. The center is required to "conduct management of the laid
off staff and workers separated from the enterprise, ensure a minimum standard of living
for laid-off staff and workers, and help the laid-off staff and workers find re-employment.
Id. The center is also responsible for providing food and medical care to the workers. Id.
Although the notice states that local government and "society" must contribute to the
center's budgetary needs, it further states that the enterprise must engage in fundraising to
pay the center's expenses. Id.; see also LAO Bu FA, NOTICE REGARDING FURTHER IMPROVEVICE CENTERS FOR STAFF AND WORKERS" (Gen. Office of

MENT OF THE

W

ORK OF POVERTY RELIEF AND THE RE-EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS (Ministry of

Labor [P.R.C.], No. 166, 1997), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw62.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
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nates the requirement of payment for goods, siphons capital from
the market economy, and may discourage innovation and labor.
The State, therefore, cannot be overly involved in providing welfare assistance if its goal is to stimulate and encourage a market
economy; 34 the State cannot successfully satisfy affected individuals' minimal needs, lest it reinstate the socialist system it seeks to
dismantle.3 5 Yet some system of pervasive and successful socialism
is required to induce individuals to concede the State's withdrawal
from its role as omnipotent provider of individual needs and
desires, and thereby stimulate the market economy.
The answer is to encourage a private, voluntary welfare system
funded by altruistic investment that can satisfy individual needs
and desires without dampening or preventing the emergence of a
vigorous, amoral profit-driven market economy. Domestic altruistic investors should be able to easily identify their future yield.
Those who are most directly successful or expect to be so in a market economy do not want social unrest to delay or cause the
retrenchment of that economy. The private wealth such persons
derive or expect to derive from a capitalist society depends upon
social stability and a consensus that the new economy is superior to
the old economy. Two factors help achieve such a consensus, particularly amongst those who suffer the most during and after the
transition. The first pertains to the extent to which individual suffering can be eliminated during the transition period. A theoretical premise of this Article is that for anybody to get rich somebody
must be poor and, it is impossible to completely eliminate the suffering brought about by unequal wealth distribution. Rather, it is
possible to make that suffering bearable both on an individual and
societal basis. Second, those who do suffer during the transition
must believe that their suffering in the midst of others' newfound
wealth is temporary. Suffering persons must understand and
believe that they have not been permanently assigned to the lower
economic classes. There is value to those who succeed during and
after the transition in bringing about these two factors. The value
34. "The challenge facing tax authorities worldwide is to respond to these changes in
a manner that does not impede economic development and growth, but that at the same
time will create a stable revenue stream for governmental operations." Milton Cerney,
Taxation and Transition: Nonprofit Organizations in a Market Economy, 26 EXEMPr ORG. TAX
REv. 235, 238 (1999).
35. THE WoRLD BANK, supra note 27, at xx (noting that government cannot simultaneously introduce market discipline while also maintaining policies designed to protect state
enterprises and their employees from the consequences of market discipline, lest the transition be defeated or at least delayed).
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is embodied in social stability and relatively manageable social
unrest. The factors may be brought about and enhanced when
successful persons make altruistic investments-gifts and donations
to charitable causes that assist unsuccessful persons-designed to
increase the social stability upon which the market economy and
private individual wealth is dependent. The return to the altruistic
investor is the future continuation of the market economy. This
theory assumes that the continuation of the market economy is
more valuable than the original altruistic investment. Stated
another way, private persons who are indeed successful during and
after a transition to a market economy must understand that altruistic investment is actually a cost of that success to the extent it
assures a stable social environment in which the market economy
can thrive. 36 Private wealth owners might already recognize this
correlation, but in general, their individualized efforts to help
needy persons will be limited for several reasons. First, in a society
where the State has monopolized wealth, there will be too few individual wealthy people to make a significant difference during the
transition years. The few individual wealthy people will be unable
to meet the needs of the many who suffer economic hardship and,
in any event, they will likely be more concerned with consolidating
their own immediate winnings. Second, in the absence of a formal
program of stimulation and reward, many wealthy people, and this
is true even in a mature market economy with sufficient numbers
of wealthy individuals, will assume that somebody else will recognize and meet the individual needs of those who suffer hardships
in the market economy. The individual, would-be altruistic investor might reasonably perceive a greater personal benefit in not participating in the private welfare system under the assumption that
others will adequately supply the need. To compensate for the
dearth of wealthy people and the tendency to free ride, the private
system of welfare will need collective activity stimulated by the
expectation of individual reward. Since true altruism does not
exist, and the market economy punishes its occurrence in any
event, the individuals who would participate in the collective, private action must perceive some private benefit from doing so, and
that perceived benefit must be greater than the benefit they would
achieve via free-riding. The implication is that tax-encouraged
36. Winners in a transition economy can either "compensate the losses of other
groups" in the economy or "generate enough political pressure to neutralize opposition to
continued reform." Id. at xxiii. Altruistic investment would be one method of compensating losses.
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individual and collective action aggregates the effect of few individuals and, by providing an immediate financial reward only for
those who actually participate, discourages free-riding. Collective
altruistic investment, though, depends upon an external organizing stimulus that neither dictates nor takes over that collective
action but nevertheless provides a system of predictable reward.
Tax provisions provide the necessary stimuli by providing an immediate yield to individual investors.
An obvious solution to the lack of wealthy people within the transitioning economy is to find wealthy people outside the economy
who might benefit from the transition. China is, after all, the most
populated country in the world and only a relatively small percentage of its population is wealthy enough to make altruistic investments. A significant portion of those wealthy enough to make such
investments will instead direct most or all of their income in the
early transition years towards establishing and maintaining their
own relative superiority of wealth in the new economy. 37 Domestically, there are simply not enough donors to meet the needs that, if
unchecked, could threaten the social stability upon which the newborn market economy depends. All of this is probably true in any
transition economy and it is here, finally, that international altruistic investment becomes important.
It should not be difficult to demonstrate the available yield to
potential international altruistic investors. The same motivations
that apply domestically to those who are successful in the new market economy also apply to international altruistic investors. It is
38
often said that China represents a huge "untapped market,"
implying the vast amount of potential wealth available to those who
gain access to that market. In some respects that wealth is available
to domestic and foreign persons alike. Foreign investors should
therefore have similar motivations as domestic investors to see that
the transition is successful.
Another potential yield for international altruistic investors
involves larger geo-political issues. A thriving market economy and
international trade system - one created when individuals are
induced to undertake hardships during and even after a transition
period - creates strong reasons for preserving peaceful co-existence. As the market economy grows and creates new wealth, it
37. See Lee, supra note 20, at 428-29 (noting the insufficient numbers of wealthy Chinese citizens and that those wealthy enough to make donations will normally do so only if
they perceive some private benefit from doing so).
38. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 6.
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becomes more expensive to provoke or engage in expensive international conflict even for persons whose wealth is derived solely
from within their own country. Such conflict diverts labor and capital from the international market and will ultimately have a negative effect on any related domestic market. U.S. individuals, in
particular, should therefore logically anticipate a future economic
benefit from the emergence and success of the Chinese market
economy.
In mythical Utopia, people share their wealth and engage in
other forms of altruistic investment beyond their familial and geographic borders out of purely selfless motives. Humans are not
selfless and do not inhabit an ideal world. Even the most humble
and religiously pious among us can never be truly selfless, but
instead are motivated by the hope of an unimaginably great reward
in the afterlife. Other spurs to altruistic investment include the
receipt of public accolade-seeing one's name on a building, perhaps-and even the hope of a large or small financial benefit such
as might occur through a tax deduction or credit. The implicit
premise is that humans do good things ultimately for self-serving
reasons; to capture that self-serving purpose, this Article uses the
phrase "altruistic investment" rather than just "altruism." The term
need not trouble the analysis because obviously the United States
and China hold their self-interests paramount even while each
invests time, labor and capital in a manner that apparently benefits
the other. China's transition to a market economy will benefit the
United States, but the transition is motivated by China's own interest. Likewise, altruistic investment flowing from the United States
to China can be beneficial to China, but the highest motivation for
such investment is that it will further the United States' own interest. Because altruistic investment is ultimately a self- rather than
other-serving behavior, stimulating and encouraging altruistic
investment portends no sacrifice or uncompensated cost with
respect to the ultimate goals of both countries.
This article assumes that altruistic investment would not occur in
the absence of a yield to the investor. It goes further, though, and
argues that good feelings would be insufficient to generate the
level of altruistic investment necessary to assist the transition process. China is geographically and intellectually far too remote
from the United States for good feelings to play a significant role
in motivating U.S. altruistic behavior there. Thus, as in life generally, financial wealth serves as a convenient, if not deceptive, substitute for good feelings.
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In the United States, as in most market economies, the federal
tax code is a primary source of private financial yield from altruistic
investment. Citizens of market economies incur a tax cost by virtue
of their existence within the jurisdictional reaches of their tax
code. In the United States, that cost may be decreased or even
39
eliminated altogether when citizens engage in charitable activity.
China's relatively new tax code and the country's transition from a
socialist economy prevent the same conclusion with respect to the
Chinese people. Indeed, there are some indications that in China
public recognition is as equally rewarding as incremental gains in
economic wealth. 40 Such a conclusion makes more sense in a
socialist economy that theoretically prohibits inequalities in wealth
than it would in a market economy that encourages or at least
accepts wealth inequality. 4 1 In the United States, public recogni39. For a concise summary of the economic assumptions (and debates) underlying
the charitable contribution deduction, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG.,

2003

DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE

PROVISIONS CONTAINED

IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR

JCS-3-02, at 5-12 (Joint Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter STAFF OF
JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS]. The Joint Committee on Taxation
conceptualizes the charitable contribution deduction in a different manner that the conceptualization used in the text. According to the Joint Committee, instead of reducing a
citizen's tax cost, a deduction for charitable contributions decreases the cost of giving and
thus creates an incentive for giving. Id. Of course, this assumes that giving results in no
other yield to the giver. If we assume instead that the giver receives a quid pro quo then the
effect of giving is simply to reduce the giver's tax cost that he or she incurs as the price of
citizenship. Id.
40. VICTOR N. SHAW, SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA: A STUDY OF CHINESE WORK UNITS 8593 (1996) (discussing the use of public recognition in the Chinese reward system and how
public recognition sometimes translates into financial reward). "The Maoists' goal was to
inculcate the entire population with a new revolutionary ethic, based on a greater sense of
social responsibility, and to stimulate the population to work hard for the collective good to 'serve the people' - rather than to work for private gain." BARNETT, supra note 15, at 26.
41. The Chinese Communist Party sought but never really achieved a perfectly egalitarian wage structure, though it certainly came close to that goal. By 1973, income inequalities had been reduced to between 3:1 and 5:1. In the U.S. during the same time period,
wage differentials were as high as 75:1. ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 301 (1977); see also
BARNETT, supra note 15, at 23 (noting wage gaps amongst factory workers where the differential could sometimes be as great as 20:1, and between urban and rural workers). Anecdotal evidence also suggests the roughly egalitarian nature of China since 1949:
One of the most striking characteristics of Chinese society as seen by virtually any
visitor is its apparently egalitarian character in terms of income. As one travels
around China, be it in the city or in the countryside, one sees poverty but rarely
abject misery or degradation, so frequently associated with the extremes of deprivation. One certainly has the impression that the Chinese have succeeded in placing a floor on real incomes. Firsthand visual impression, at least in areas to which
foreigners have access, also shows that people seem well fed, adequately clothed at times with a relatively narrow band of differentiation in quality of dress, be it
men or women.
ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 299; see also BARNETT, supra note 15, at 23 (noting that China
from 1950 to 1980, China was able to eradicate "most of the worst poverty," "maintain a
BUDGET PROPOSAL
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tion is paramount primarily to very wealthy philanthropists who are
otherwise indifferent to marginal increases in wealth made possible
via the U.S. tax code. Even in a socialist economy, the same public
recognition is most likely valuable only to the extent it may be converted, in one form or another, into a yield that would otherwise
require financial wealth to achieve. 42 A market economy actually
punishes altruistic investment because it immediately decreases the
relative standard of living of those who engage in such actions relative to the free-riders who do not. Hence, the Chinese government
will be required to implement measures to negate that punishment, short of reinstating a socialist economy, if it wishes to stimulate private sharing of wealth during and after its transition to a
market economy. Tax incentives, targeted only to those who
engage in altruistic investment, serve that purpose. Section IV contains a detailed comparison of the tax provisions in both countries
that support and hinder a common and coordinated treatment of
altruistic investment. The two countries' tax approaches to charitable activity and charitable organizations seem quite similar. Nevertheless, there are differences that, although they must be
addressed, need not preclude a more effective system of mutual
international altruistic investment.
Through the grant of a charitable contribution deduction, the
U.S. tax code rewards individuals and corporations when they
spend wealth on the accomplishment of a charitable goal. In addition, the U.S. tax code grants tax exemption when groups of individuals join together to engage in collective charitable activity.
Without the yield made available through the U.S. tax code, a significant portion of private wealth and collective activity would not
be spent on or directed to charitable causes but would instead be
directed towards more explicitly self-serving endeavors.
The Chinese tax incentives are less predictable, at least from a
U.S. viewpoint, for two reasons. First, Chinese tax laws are relatively new. The modern charitable provisions in Chinese law are
only about ten years old and do not have benefit of years of application and interpretation. In contrast, provisions in the U.S. tax
regarding charitable activities have existed virtually unchanged for
nearly one hundred years. Second, while China is evolving into a
floor under the country's standard of living," eliminating "conspicuous consumption" and
"guarantee a minimal level of consumption" for its citizens); SUZANNE OGDEN, CHINA'S
UNRESOLVED ISSUES 107 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the implementation of an eight grade
wage scale that reduced wage disparities between the highest and lowest paid workers to
3:1).
42. See supra note 40.
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nation in which law supersedes ideology, that evolutionary process
is far from complete. 43 The State still maintains and occasionally
exercises the power to ignore law when law would result in conflict
with ideology. 44 In such instances, ideology is explicitly superior to
law. 45 Instead of having a relatively transparent legal system with
respect to tax exemption, the Chinese system of tax exemption is
often characterized as opaque, 46 indicating the difficulty of predicting an outcome merely by reference to written rules. The same
might be true in the United States, except that ideology's influence
is implicit rather than explicit. This is a difficult and debatable
proposition because even in the United States, a country that
claims a much longer history of governance by law rather than ideology, it is difficult to ascertain and prove that a legal consequence
is derived purely from law as opposed to ideology. In the United
States, ideology might very well dictate a legal decision but we refer
instead to the application of "public policy," or 'judicial interpretation" rather than explicit political ideology. 47 Third, Chinese tax
law is more standard- than rule-based. While the U.S. tax code is
rule-based and detailed to the point of absurdity in some cases, the
relative brevity of Chinese tax law leaves plenty of room for ambi43. For an historical analysis of the rule of law in China, see Wang, supra note 31.
44. For example, the Chinese constitution states that the State may not "compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may [the State] discriminate
against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion." CHINESE CONST. ch. 1,
art. 35. And yet, American observers believe that the Chinese State routinely suppresses

religion. See U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

supra note 16, at 2.

The Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief and the freedom not to
believe; however, the Government seeks to restrict religious practice to government-sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship and to control
the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups. Membership in many
faiths is growing rapidly; however, while the Government generally does not seek
to suppress this growth outright, it tries to control and regulate religious groups
to prevent the rise of groups or sources of authority outside the control of the
Government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and cracks down on
groups that it perceives to pose a threat.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 122
(2001), available at http://www.sate.gov/documents/organization/9001.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Report on International Religious Freedom].
45. Barnett, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that "it will not be easy to overcome longstanding Chinese traditions, which have stressed rule by men rather than by laws and,
more recently, Party dominance of legal institutions").
46. Uncertainty with regard to legal rights and obligations increases transaction costs

and thereby discourages potential market actors from entering.
NOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CHINA IN THE WORLD

ORGANIZATION FOR

ECONOMY-

Eco-

THE DOMESTIC

364-68 (2002) [hereinafter OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY].
This conclusion is no less applicable to altruistic investors.
47. See, e.g., BobJones University v. Comm'r, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that public
policy prohibits tax exemption for a charitable organization that engages in racial discrimination even though no such prohibition is stated in the relevant statute).
POLICY CHALLENGES
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guity and unpredictability that will require a period of practical
application to resolve. Application, rather than formalism, will provide more needed predictability.
Nevertheless, the approach in China's generally stated tax laws
appears consistent with that taken by the U.S. tax code. Under its
income tax laws, China grants a deduction from taxable income for
"the part of individual income donated to educational and other
public welfare undertakings." 48 Goods and services commonly
associated with charitable endeavors in the United States, such as
equipment used in scientific research or teaching, health care or
cultural performances, are exempted from China's value added
and business taxes. 49 As in the United States, China encourages
collective charitable activity, but only under closely monitored circumstances, and groups of individuals so engaged are apparently
50
exempt from taxation.
When the U.S tax code makes a financial concession to an individual by a deduction, credit or exemption, one can easily detect
an attempt to coordinate national policy and individual behavior.
Granting a deduction to employers and employees when they contribute to a retirement account for the employee's benefit is consistent with the national policy of providing for the care and support
for the elderly without draining the resources of the working market economy. There are many more examples. Suffice it to say
that the coordination of individual behavior and national policy
characterizes almost all tax expenditures, most notably the charitable contribution deduction and the exemption for collective charitable activity. For example, beginning with the Reagan
administration and continuing through the second Bush administration, the executive branch has explicitly championed the charitable contribution deduction and tax exemption for collective
charitable activities as a means to justify and counteract the hardships resulting from the retrenchment of the welfare system in the
48. Individual Income Tax Law [P.R.C.], art. 6 (1999).
49. Provisional Value-Added Tax Regulations [P.R.C.], art. 16 (1994); Provisional
Regulations of The People's Republic of China on Business Tax (1994).
50. Curiously, none of the laws pertaining to altruistic organizations in China explicitly state that such organizations shall be exempt from taxes. It seems implicit in the various
tax statutes that taxation occurs when organizations engage in profit-seeking activities.
Actual statements of this proposition are scarce, primarily applying to foreign altruistic
organizations. See Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on Issues Concerning
Improvement of Taxation Collection Administration for Foreign Enterprises Resident Representative Offices [P.R.C.], art. I(II) (Sept. 13, 1996) (stating that foreign "nonprofit"
organizations will not be subject to tax in China).
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United States. 5' As one means to induce individuals to allow the
withdrawal of the government safety net, the U.S. government
encourages altruistic investment, whether individually or via collective action. The withdrawal of the welfare state under those administrations, moreover, was put forth as one method to reinvigorate
the market economy. The existence and invigoration of a market
economy necessarily implies or perhaps requires unequal distributions of wealth, the resentment from which can be dampened by
altruistic investment. This is why Republican administrations, in
particular, tout altruistic investment in the United States.
In a socialist economy that theoretically prohibits the private
ownership of wealth and wealth disparities, encouraging altruistic
investment is entirely irrelevant. Now that China has shifted from
an attempt to guarantee equal and no less than minimal wealth
distribution to a system that necessarily accepts some level of unequal and sub-minimal wealth distribution, a policy that encourages
altruistic investment is entirely relevant and China has tentatively
adopted such policies. The axiomatic point of these observations is
that both countries attempt to define tax laws in a manner that is
most conducive to their national priorities.
III.

THE NEED FOR ALTRUISTIC INVESTMENT IN THE CHINESE

TRANSITION ECONOMY

The phrase, "iron rice bowl," best explains the period of time
during which altruistic investment was entirely irrelevant in the
Chinese socialist economy. It embodies the legal, economic and
cultural measures by which the State guaranteed an equal and no
less than minimum level of subsistence for every individual in Chinese society. 52 The State controlled the various market and legal
51. See Atkinson, supra note 1, at 505 n.l (discussing the Reagan and first Bush
Administration's strategy of encouraging charitable activities while also reducing the government's role in providing for social welfare); see also STAFF OFJOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION
OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 39 (regarding the second Bush Administration's propo-

sal to expand the charitable contribution deduction to non-itemizers).
52. The iron rice bowl was constructed via the "command economy," described as a
system whereby:
[the] planners articulate a very detailed bill (list) of the final (consumer and
capital) goods and services they desired. They would then have to decide, on the
basis of the technological choices open to them, how much land, labor, capital,
raw materials, various kinds of technical skill, and managerial inputs were
required to produce this desired final bill of goods and services ....
Having
decided on the desired bill of goods and services and on the quantity and quality
of factor inputs necessary to produce them, these factors then would be allocated
to the desired uses through direct orders, by commands transmitted through
administrative channels.... The commands in turn may be based either on coercive and/or normative appeals. That is, factors, particularly labor, may be
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mechanisms in a manner intended to eliminate and prohibit inequalities of wealth. Beyond the minimal level of subsistence, individual preference was disregarded. 53 The "iron rice bowl"
metaphor is applicable not only to individual biological needs, but
cultural, entertainment, education and expressive (intellectual)
desires as well. Thus, in a system in which "everyone eats from the
same bowl," that bowl being inviolate and omnipotent, there is no
need for or tolerance of extra-governmental activity, whether the
goal is to meet basic human needs or satisfy individual
54
preferences.
It will be necessary to reform the legal mechanisms that enforced
the irrelevancy of altruistic investment as the Chinese government
presently withdraws its omnipotent hand from society. 55 The withdrawal of the government's overall equalizing authority with
directed to particular sectors, localities, and production units on the basis of
appeals to patriotism or to communist values without any resort to differentiated
rewards. [i.e., higher or lower wages] Alternatively and under certain circumstances, factors, particularly labor, may actually be forced to submit themselves
involuntarily to certain types of work in certain localities and under certain
conditions.
ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 40. Other writers described China's command economy as
involving (1) State ownership and operation of industry and transport, (2) collectivization
of agriculture, (3) periodic economic planning by bureaucrats, (4) emphasis on investment in military and heavy industry, and (5) centralized provision of consumer goods sufficient to sustain the population. Ashbrook, supra note 31, at 18. Still others add that (6)
profits are entirely remitted to the government which then reallocates profits to cover
losses of state enterprises, government administrative costs and defense, (7) prices and
wages are set by the state, and (8) trade and transport of most commodities are carried out
by state enterprises, including the distribution of consumer goods through state retailtrade stores. Robert F. Dernberger, Economic Policy and Performance, in JOINT ECON. COMM.,
99TH CONG., 1 CHINA'S ECONOMY LOOKS TOWARD THE YEAR 2000, S. PRT. No. 99-149, at 22
(Joint Comm. Print 1986).
53. The subordination of individual interests to those of the Communist Party, which
is the State itself, is a theme thoroughly interwoven with Chinese socialism. See ECKSTEIN,
supra note 16, at 34 (quoting various Party leaders on the need for self-denial).
54. "Citizens' identities were based on their work assignments, and the government
supervised citizens' behavior and provided a social safety net. This situation left little
opportunity or incentive for citizens to create social organizations outside the government
structure." XIN CHUNYING & ZAI NG YE, PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN ASIA 88 (Thomas Silk
ed., 1999).
55. Facing an open world, China needs greatly to build up its NGO sector. The
demands originating from an open world: economic globalization, new types of
international aid, the formation of international civil society, and so on, require
Chinese NGO's to react and play a positive role both at home and abroad. The
demand originating from China's reform and development: the transition
towards the market economy and the new role and functions of the Chinese government, require Chinese NGO's to assume many essential functions previously
taken by the government and to provide various social services.
Li-Quing Zhao, Strategic Options for Building the Chinese NGO Sector in an Open World, 2 INT'L
J. NOT FOR PROFIT L. (2000), available at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss2/
archinaoptions.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
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respect to the allocation of goods and services will quickly lead to
inequalities and resulting discontent, if those inequalities are not
otherwise addressed. 56 Reform of the mechanisms intended to

prevent unequal wealth distribution and profit-making will necessitate reform of the mechanisms by which altruistic investment is
encouraged and regulated.
Intuitive assertions and arguments for reform make little sense
without an understanding of social, political, historical, and economic context. A broad understanding of that context will assist in
the analysis of the reforms presently occurring with respect to
altruistic investment. This section continues with an overview of
the major factors that have rendered altruistic investment irrelevant. These factors begin with State ownership of the "means of
production" 57 and the use of the "work unit"58 not only to eliminate the concept of profit and social inequality, but as the primary
means of social welfare delivery. 59 In essence, the State exercised
ownership over all property and dominion over all citizens according to state-defined desires. 60 As discussed in detail below, this historical aversion to individualism in Chinese culture is a
surmountable obstacle to mutual recognition of charitable organizations in the United States and China.
China also rendered altruistic investment irrelevant by its control
over geographical living preferences. For example, under a system
known as hukou, the State strictly regulates internal migration and
56. Ideally, the Communist Party exercised authority via normative measures - instilling and bringing about a sense of idealism based on nationalism and patriotism - to motivate individuals to share in the allocation and mobilization of resources. If normative
appeals failed, coercive appeals - legal orders relating to the allocation of labor, capital
and raw materials, or physical terror. ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 37. Remunerative appeals
(higher or lower wages) were not part of the Maoist ideal because they implied wealth
inequalities. Id. at 40-41.
57. When the CCP gained power in 1949, business ownership was divided into three
types. The State had exclusive ownership of approximately 35% of all business and joint
ownership with private individuals of another 2% of business properties. The remaining
63% of business was privately held. Id. at 76. By 1956 the State had exclusive ownership of
67% of all business, and shared ownership in the remaining 33%. Id. The State nationalized the business sector not by outright seizures but through "relentless high pressure
gradualism" - predatory pricing, and confiscatory levies (fines and taxes), both of which
eventually forced private enterprise from the marketplace. Id.
58. SHAw, supra note 40, at xi, 1.
59. Social welfare delivery includes food, shelter, transportation, recreation, education, health care, and retirement.
60. SHAw, supra note 40, at 173 (life necessities delivered via the work unit include
salary and subsidies, housing, coal, fruit, bus passes, medical care, child care and education, recreation facilities, libraries, gardens, sports, entertainment, vacation, and welfare
for the aged, sick and disabled).
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vocational occupations of individuals. 61 Essentially, individuals are
assigned to the geographical area of their birth and to one vocation for their entire lives. 6 2 Those persons who reside outside of
their assigned area are not entitled to housing, medical care, education or other social services. 63 Such restrictions assist in the
administration and maintenance of the iron rice bowl, 64 but they
also constitute an extreme manifestation of the State's disregard
for individual preference. Still another relevant factor relating to
the maintenance of the iron rice bowl is the State's control over
entry and exit of firms. In a market economy, entry and exit of
firms is related to the satisfaction of market demand in a manner
that results in profit to firm owners. Stated very simply, profit
potential leads firms to enter the market and lack of profit causes
firms to exit, either through liquidation, bankruptcy or acquisition
by another firm. Socialist ideas alter this pattern, particularly as

61.

See generally KAM WING CaN & Li ZHANG, THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND RURAL-URBAN
IN
CHINA:
PROCESSES
AND
CHANGES
(1998), available at http://

MIGRATION

csde.washington.edu/pubs/wps/98-13.pdf. (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
62. The "hukou registration" determines a person's permanent residence, while the
"hukou status" determines one's occupation. Id. at 4. Hukou registration in a particular
locale determines the registrant's rights to participate in the locale's social welfare system
(e.g., food subsidies). Id. Hukou registration (normally either urban or rural) and hukou
status (traditionally either agricultural or nonagricultural) is inherited from the mother
and not at all a matter of personal choice. Id. at 5. Changing one's registration or status is
very difficult, particularly with regard to changing one's registration and status from rural/
agricultural to urban/nonagricultural; the process might be analogized to gaining an entry
visa to the United States (hence, subject to the applicant's qualifications and the sought
after new locale's quota). Id. at 6. The overriding goal is to prevent uncontrolled internal
migration into urban areas where economic opportunities exceed those available in rural
areas. Id. at 10-11. Thus, it is much easier to migrate out of cities to rural areas than viceversa. Id. Although the hukou system has experienced some relaxation, its essential features remain the same. See China Labour Bulletin, Residence Registration to Stay; Migration
Eased, Feb. 26, 2002, available at http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article-pv.adp?articleid=2053. (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) (quoting the Deputy Director of China's Public Security Bureau, Bao Suixian, on the importance of maintaining the residence registration system for the purpose of keeping public order, economic and social planning).
63.

OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 552.

64.
Unlike population registration systems in many other countries, the Chinese system was designed not merely to provide population statistics and identify personal status, but also to directly regulate population distribution and serve many
other important objectives desired by the State. In fact, the hukou system is a
major tool of social control by the State.
CHAN & ZHANG, supra note 61, at 2. The State's control of internal migration helped prevent the ills normally associated with rapid urbanization, such as homelessness, crime, and
large scale unemployment. BARNETr, supra note 15, at 25.
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those ideas were implemented in China. 6 5 On the entry side,
autarkic policies encouraged severe redundancy of firms across
Chinese regions. 66 Thus, despite comparative advantages and the
insufficiency of market share, duplicate firms existed and still exist
across regions.

67

Because firms existed not to generate profit but as a means of
social welfare delivery, exit was severely limited and prohibited in
most cases. Mergers, acquisitions and liquidations were not
approved and undertaken for reasons relating to economies of
scale or profit availability. Instead, consolidating activities short of
liquidations were undertaken only as necessary to repair the social
welfare delivery system-to keep an unprofitable enterprise going
because of social policy concerns-and liquidations were rarely
allowed. 68 The allocation of surplus capital within the socialist
economy was closely related to the control of entry and exit.
Credit allocations are a means by which capital is directed to the
most efficient uses within a market. In the Chinese socialist economy, though, credit was allocated not on the basis of profitability
and efficiency but on the need to continue the delivery of social
welfare, as well as the maintenance of social control. 69 Profits
escheated to the State and were redistributed in accordance with
65. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 174 -178 (providing a
detailed discussion of the governmental barriers and mandates with regard to consolidation of enterprises in China).
66. Id. at 134 (regarding the "chronic oversupply" of industries across regions, the
consequence of which has been deflationary pressures).
67. The Chinese drive for complete self-reliance extended deep into Chinese society
and meant that counties and prefectures were "supposed to establish independent industrial systems and function as virtually independent economic units." OGDEN, supra note 41,
at 63. This resulted in severe manufacturing and agricultural redundancies across China.
Id. For example, there are presently more than 120 automobile companies in China, more
than the aggregate number in the United States,Japan, and all of Europe combined. Id. at
148.
68. Id. at 136-37 (discussing the "non-commercial objectives" that restricted mergers
and acquisitions). "Inefficient producers are very slow to exit, as they are under the
umbrella of local protectionism and are helped by subsidies (disguised in the form of
loans) from the banking system." Id. at 166. For a contemporary example of potentially
inefficient consolidations, see Charles Hutzler, China's Big 3 Airlines Gear up to Expand,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2002, at B4 (discussing state mandated merger of profitable and
redundant, unprofitable airlines).
69. One example of inefficient use of credit involves the continued governmental
support of inefficient state owned enterprises in China. Small business fueled much of the
economic growth in the late 1980's and early 1990's, in particular by absorbing employees
who had lost their agricultural jobs as economic transition continued. See generally OECD,
CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 83-88. But China's continuing diversion
of credit to its money-losing state owned enterprises has hampered the ability of small
business to expand and continue absorbing displaced agricultural workers. Id. at 90-91.

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 36

social policy rather than economic efficiency. 70 In theory, these
contextual factors resulted in the complete absence of profit incentive and social inequality. A natural consequence was the irrelevancy of altruistic investment,7 ' there being no admission or
recognition of poverty or individual preference such as would be
manifested by charitable giving and the emergence of private charitable organizations.
Although China is most often described and understood as a
socialist nation, its implementation of the socialist ideas has been
relatively short-lived. 72 China is at least 3500 years old, 73 and the
contextual factors discussed above were not fully implemented
until 1956, seven years after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
defeated the Kuomintang. 74 By 1978 reformers within the CCP
began to advocate "consumerism," with its implicit acceptance of
profit incentive and social inequalities. 75 Hence, the irrelevancy of
70.

ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 107-08.

71. Constitutionally, China's political system is unitary and highly centralized. In
such a centralized society, public and private spheres are never clearly distinct.
This state of affairs provides little room for non-governmental organizations
(NGO's) to exist. Especially in the pre-reform era, public ownership of organizations - with the government monopolizing all resources - did not allow NPO's
independent access to financial and other resources. Thus independent NGOs
were impossible.
CHUNYING & YE, supra note 54, at 88.

72. In fact, the great majority of China's history prior to 1949 is characterized more by
a trade and barter system in which Western countries, possessing greater military power,
imposed unfair economic terms on China. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 3

(discussing the United States and Great Britain's acquisition via force of trading "concessions" during the nineteenth century); see also Robin Hutcheon, CapitalistBulls in the Socialist China Shop: How the Two Learned to Co-exist, in GREATER CHINA: LAw, SOCIETY AND TRADE

11 (Alice E-S Tay & Conita S.C. Leung eds., 1995); ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 11-12, 28-29
(describing China's pre-modern economy as a "highly organized market system [with] a
hierarchy of local, intermediate, and inter-regional markets[ ]").
73.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 3.

74. Immediately after the communist takeover, China's foreign trade was confined
primarily to exchanges with the Soviet Union. Ashbrook, supra note 31, at 19. But even
after the takeover, China never limited its foreign trade exclusively to exchanges with other
socialist countries, as was the case with the former Soviet bloc and other Asian socialist
countries. LAvWGNE, supra note 11, at 65. Because of its deteriorating relationships with the
Soviet Union, China began engaging in trade with non-communist nations as early as 1950
and this process likely would have continued unabated were it not for the Korean war,
which involved the United States and China on opposite sides. See BARNETT, supra note 15,
at 3 (referring to the period during which China's limited its foreign trade to Soviet bloc
nations as an aberration). Foreign trade, though, was often viewed by some Chinese political ideologists as antithetical to communist ideas of self-reliance and denounced because it
implied that China was inferior to other countries. Id. at 123.
75. "At the pivotal December 1978 Third Plenum (of the l1th Party Congress Central
Committee), the leadership adopted economic reform policies aimed at expanding rural
income and incentives, encouraging experiments in enterprise autonomy, reducing central planning, and attracting direct foreign investment in China." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
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altruistic investment is scarcely more than a twenty-year
phenomenon.
In fact, altruistic investment ceased to be completely irrelevant in
1978 when the CCP began actively encouraging foreign investment, primarily through the establishment of "special economic
zones." 76 In addition, the CCP instituted the "household responsibility system" and began a limited reformation of state-owned
enterprises. 77 Within special economic zones the profit incentive,
rather than the iron rice bowl, constituted the primary means to
deliver essentials and luxuries of life to the populace . 7 The State
encouraged foreign investment 79 and allowed the market and individual preference to thrive. Under the household responsibility
STATE, supra note 16, at 5; see also Dernberger, supra note 52, at 17 (noting that "open
consumerism" was approved and encouraged). "The reformers felt that they could ideologically rationalize some people becoming wealthier than others as long as those who got
rich did not trample on the socialist principle of non-exploitation of labor." OGDEN, supra
note 41, at 91. The term "reformers" is used in a relative sense, primarily referring to postMaoist leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xioping, all of whom advocated
China's move away from strict egalitarianism and towards market principles coupled with
socialist values. See BARNETr, supra note 15, at 12-13. After Mao's death, a new generation of
leadership actually began to advocate disparate material incentives as a means to stimulate
productivity. Id. at 46-47. They even went so far as to explicitly proclaim that "absolute
equality is wrong." Id. The shift, of course, resulted from a more pragmatic, less idealized
view of the world and human nature:
In general, many of the planners, economists, and technocrats were preoccupied
with technical considerations and requirements, the need for technical skills,
material incentives, and more or less balanced growth with proper attention paid
to complementarities and inter-relations between different sectors of the economy. These same groups tended to favor a greater scope for the market mechanism, private plots, population control policies, and generally a less ideological
approach to economic policy problems and economic management.
ECKSTEIN,

supra note 16, at 47-48.

76. Special economic zones were originally instituted as "special export zones"
designed only to manage foreign trade under closely controlled circumstances. Thomas
Chan et al., China's Special Economic Zones: Ideology, Policy and Practice, in CHINA'S SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES: POLICIES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 88 (Y.C.

Jao & C.K. Leung eds.,

1986). By 1981, however, special economic zones had become a tool for the experimental
introduction of capitalism in China. Id. at 99.
77. OGDEN, supra note 41, at 93 (regarding the household responsibility system).
78. The idea of special economic zones originated from Lenin's "New Economic Policy" which allowed for concessions made to foreign investors that were thought to be helpful to the building of a socialist society. Chan et al., supra note 76, at 93. A concession was
defined as "a contract between the government and a capitalist who undertakes to organize
or improve production and to pay the government a share of the product obtained, keeping the rest as his profit." Id. Thus, within special economic zones, the State tolerated and
encouraged private ownership of the means of production and the private retention of
profit. The State also allowed for market based wages and for limited, rather than lifetime
employment contracts. Id. at 95, 100.
79. U.S. companies alone account for over 20,000 joint ventures and wholly foreignowned enterprises in China and more than 100 U.S. based corporations are engaged in

China. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

supra note 16, at 17.
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system, individual households were required to contribute crops in
satisfaction of a rural collective's assigned quota, essentially a tax
paid in kind,80 but could retain and sell surplus crops in rural free
markets. 8 1 During the same period, the central government began
to allow managers of state-owned enterprises to retain and reinvest
profits in the enterprises' on-going operations and to do so in the
most profitable manner. 8 2 Still, these limited experiments with
free, profit-based markets did nothing to weaken the inviolate
social safety net. Whatever incentive might have existed for altruistic investment could not have been very significant.
In contrast, emerging social inequalities often led to resentments
that were most commonly assuaged through forced contributions-extracted for social welfare purposes-above and beyond
those extractions required to meet the collective's centrally
assigned quota.8 3 These forced extractions can be viewed as precursors to China's present need for altruistic investment. In a
sense, altruistic investment made by capitalists are necessary or
"forced" to the extent they are required to maintain the social stability on which a capitalist economy is dependent. Capitalists must
make those investments if they want the market economy to thrive.
Similarly, local government officials in China sought to maintain
social stability while experimenting with capitalism by demanding
extra-legal, forced contributions from those profiting from special
economic zones, the household responsibility system or township
80. In addition, the small, owner-operated farms were required to purchase assigned
amounts of supplies and necessities from the State. ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 77.
81. When collectivization was instituted, farmers were permitted to retain a small
garden-sized parcel of land for their own use, usually referred to as a privateplot.
This parcel of land, adjacent to the homestead, would be used for raising livestock, particularly poultry and pigs, and for growing vegetables and occasionally
some other crops. Private plots could not occupy more than 5 percent of the
village's cultivated land area. The produce from the private plots could be disposed of by the peasants in so-called free rural markets, subject to minimal restrictions as to price, quantity sold, and other terms of sale.
Id. at 70. Indeed, in almost all socialist countries, individuals were allowed to farm a small
portion of collectivized land and sell the produce in free markets - known as "kolkhoz
markets" in the USSR. LAVIGNE, supra note 11, at 9.
82. Barnett, supra note 13, at 9; see also Blumental, supra note 9, at 231 (summarizing
regulations relating to the implementation of new management procedures for stateowned enterprises).
83. As of 2000, farmers were required to pay Government taxes, township levies (used
for education, social expenses, family planning, public transportation and milia), village
levies (i.e., contributions to local public accumulation funds, welfare funds, and administrative fees) and other arbitrary fees, levies, and fines. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECON-

OMY, supra note 46, at 107. In addition, farmers were required to contribute about a
month's worth of labor to the local government. Id.
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and village enterprises (TVEs) .84 Thus, altruistic investment
introduction of
gained limited relevancy with the 8 experimental
5
profit incentives in Chinese society.
If and when the profit incentive is loosed wholesale on Chinese6
8
society, altruistic investment will become absolutely necessary.
The State's dismantling of the iron rice bowl and its explicit reliance on profit incentives for the efficient delivery of goods and
services to the populace will lead to displacements and inequalities
87
that invariably precede social unrest and grass roots resistance.
In fact, the State is presently replacing the iron rice bowl with the
profit incentive and is therefore facing the very types of resentments and hardships that altruistic investment can alleviate.8 8 The
84. The TVE burden can be defined as additional fees, penalties and contributions imposed on TVE's by authorities at various levels that go beyond regular
taxes and contributions based on the TVE Law and other national regulations.
These various institutions impose more than 1000 payments on TVEs that can be
classified into four categories: apportionments, penalties, funds collection and
fees. Some administrative units charge arbitrary fees for their services that are
much higher than the amounts set by state regulations. Others force TVEs to
make financial contributions under "donations" or "support.".... According to
some estimates, in 1999 the "TVE burden ...[accounted] for about 20 percent of
TVE after-tax profit.
Id. at 92.
85. Similarly, altruistic investment began to emerge as a relevant factor when Central
and Eastern European states transitioned from socialist to market economies.
The drive to recreate nonprofit organizations in Central and Eastern Europe
comes not only from a desire to restore these institutions, but also from the pressing needs in these countries, where many support systems, including health care,
are in the midst of a sudden and often traumatic transition from state to private
control. While these needs have created great risks, they have also provided
remarkable opportunities for international nonprofit partnerships.
Cerny, supra note 34, at 236.
86. CHUNYING & YE, supra note 54, at 88-89 (noting that the transition process has
"eroded the central government's ability to meet societal needs and created demands and
'space' for nonprofit organizations"). THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at 33 (noting that
amongst the public goods that will be necessary will be "a social system that promotes the
development and maintenance of human capital").
87. "The cultural and social impact of increasing inequities and changing social status, resulting from progressively differential incentive systems, may be substantial. The economic restructuring or reform process may create an upper and an under class in rural
and urban settings that could generate social and ideological backlash." John P. Hardt,
Summary, in JOINT ECON. COMM., 92D CONG., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT, at XI (1972). An example of severe social unrest occurred in February 2000,
when more than 20,000 workers at the Yangjiazhangzi Mine near Beijing staged a violent
riot after the State announced that it was closing the state-run mine as part of the transition process. Bhala, supra note 26, at 1483. In March 2002, another 20,000 workers in
Daquing and 10,000 workers in Liaoyang protested the government's decision to shut
down state-owned oil drilling operations. Hope and Despair, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2002, at A9.
88. A wide variety of social problems have arisen from China's rapid economic
growth and extensive reforms, including pollution, a widening of income disparities between the coastal and inner regions of China, and a growing number of
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early 1980s experiments with the household responsibility system,
the reformation of state-owned enterprises, and the introduction
of special economic zones have each evolved into accepted economic planning tools throughout China. The ideas underlying the
household responsibility system are now further embodied in
TVEs, s9 and the market forces previously confined to special economic zones have been introduced throughout China. 90 Likewise,
the reforming or closing of state-owned enterprises has proceeded,
though at a much slower pace, to the point that profit incentive
dictates entry, investment, operations, and exit. 9 1 As a result,
urban overcrowding and overall unemployment is rising. 92
bankruptcies and worker layoffs. This poses several challenges to the government,
such as enacting regulations to control pollution, focusing resources on infrastructure development in the hinterland, and developing modern fiscal and tax
systems to address various social concerns (such as poverty alleviation, health
care, education, worker retraining, pensions, and social security).
Morrison, supra note 15.
89. Township and village enterprises include "rural non-agricultural" household
based enterprises, generally employing eight people or less. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 85 (2002). As of 2002, these small businesses employed about
20% of the total labor force and provided nearly 50% of China's total industrial output. Id.
From 1984 to 1996, TVE's took in about 83 million former agriculture workers. Id. at 88. By
2010 they are expected to absorb about one-third of the nearly 80 million agricultural
workers that will be displaced during the further transition process. Id.
90. There were originally only 4 special economic zones and now there are over 2000.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 9.
91.
[Clyclical changes are most pronounced in respect to the role of politics and
the Communist Party in the management of the industrial firm. Thus, roughly
between 1952 and 1955, the Party was somewhat in the background; from 1956 to
1958 it began to play a more important policy role, leaving the actual day-to-day
operations to management and technical personnel. The Great Leap placed
politics in command and with it the Party assumed responsibility not only for
policy direction but for management, thus in many cases virtually displacing or
closely controlling and directing the firm's executives and engineers. With the
collapse of the Great Leap and the onset of the Great Crisis in 1960 or 1961, the
importance of technical and managerial considerations was recognized once
again. However management remained subordinated to the Party, with the latter
providing policy and ideological direction and the former being responsible for
factory operations under the overall direction of the enterprise Party committee
or branch.
ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 84.
92. As of 1998, observers estimated that the "floating population" in China - i.e., the
number of persons residing outside of their assigned area and thus not entitled to certain
social benefits - was between 50-200 million. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra
note 46, at 552. Most are migrating to the cities in search of economic opportunity. Chan
& Zhang, supra note 61, at 23.
A report in China Daily (11 March) states that half of the country's 60 million
poor and needy people are in urban areas. The majority of the 30 million urban
needy are laid-off and unemployed workers, accounting for 7-10 percent of the
total urban population. According to the report, more than five million workers
laid-off from state-owned enterprises failed to find new jobs by the end of 2001.
The actual number of unemployed is estimated to be much higher than the official statistics.
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Accession to the WTO represents China's high water mark with
regard to the dismantling of the iron rice bowl and its embrace of
the profit incentive. 93 The WTO is dedicated to the improvement
of international trade through the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers that impede the profit-induced, free flow of goods
and services across borders. 94 The WTO implicitly embodies the
rejection of the socialist goal of State-mandated equal wealth distribution and no less than minimal levels of material subsistence.
Instead, the WTO embraces the profit incentive as the exclusive

95
and best means of ensuring and increasing individual welfare.

Hence, China's sixteen-year pursuit 96 and ultimate attainment of

WTO membership represents that unleashing of the profit incentive such that altruistic investment will become indispensable.
WTO membership requires that China withdraw from its
omnipotent position with respect to the delivery of goods and services. 9 7 Because that role was ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining social order and welfare, the State's withdrawal leaves a
severe vacuum. 98 Free market societies are grounded on a certain
China Labour Bulletin, Unemployment and UrbanPoverty Cause Concerns at NPC, Mar. 3, 2002,
available at http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso/news-item.adp?news-id=1836 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004).
93. China gained admission to the World Trade Organization on November 10, 2001.
Accession of the People's Republic of China, Dec. 11, 2001, WTO B.I.S.D. [Doc No. 015996] (2001). Protocol on Accession of The People's Republic of China Done at Doha on
10 November 2001, entered into force, Nov. 20, 2002, WVTO B.I.S.D. [Doc. No. 01-5902]
(2002); see, e.g., Bhala, supra note 26 (discussing the history of negotiations leading to
China's admission to the WTO).
94. The World Trade Organization came into being on April 15, 1994, and is the
successor to the organization established under the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], April 15, 1994. See also Blumental, supra note 9, at 219.
95. Blumental, supra note 9, at 238 (" [T] he basic premise of GATT is that free trade
promotes increased wealth, which in turn means that people will live better and in
peace.").
96. China began seeking WTO membership in 1986. Bhala, supra note 26, at 1469.
97. In general, China's protocol of accession requires that it (1) apply all of its "laws,
regulations and other measures" pertaining to trade in goods, services and intellectual
property in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, (2) provide a mechanism to
receive and redress complaints of violations of (1) above, (3) create a transparent system of
laws and regulations, (4) create an independent judiciary, (5) treat foreign business the
same as domestic business, (6) extend the right to trade in goods (except certain listed
commodities) to all enterprises in China, (7) ensure that import purchasing procedures of
state trading enterprises are transparent, (8) phase out all non-tariff barriers to trade, (9)
eliminate price controls, and (10) eliminate all subsidies, including those provided to state
owned enterprises. Protocol on The Accession of the People's Republic of China, supra
note 93.
98. For example, WTO accession is expected to result in severe job loss in China's
agricultural areas (which account for nearly 70% of China's 1.3 billion population).
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faith that the maintenance of social welfare is a natural consequence of peoples' mad and selfish pursuit of profit. That faith is
premised upon the existence of a mature market economy in
which opportunities ebb and flow to a populace collectively able to
seize them.99 Prior to China's transition, the State owned, operated and insisted upon the continued existence of redundant and
inefficient enterprises employing large numbers of idle and unnecessary workers unconcerned with positioning themselves for new
opportunity. 10 0 State-owned enterprises were the very means by
which the State guaranteed social welfare. 10 1 In the transition
economy, and consistent with the terms of the WTO Protocol, the
State has undertaken to eliminate these economically inefficient
operations' 0 2 and rely upon the market to deliver social welfare.
Yet the market is only in its infancy and cannot immediately fill the
resulting social welfare vacuum. 10 3 Even if the market were able to
immediately fill the vacuum by creating new opportunities, the
populace would be unprepared to efficiently extract those opportunities. 10 4 Predictably, this convergence of facts has lead to widespread unemployment. 0 5 Because employment was the exclusive
OECD,

CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 130. But nearly 90% of the rural
population is completely cut-off from any formal welfare system. Id. at 105.
99. According to a Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security survey, nearly 50%
of urban job seekers lacked basic technical skills. At the same time, 50% of available jobs
required such skills. China Labour Bulletin, Harsh Reality of China's Labour Market, Aug. 23,
2001, available at http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso/newsbrief-pv.adp?news-id=1601 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2004).
100. "The largest [state operated enterprises], like the mammoth Capital Steel, are
literally small cities unto themselves, responsible for providing medical care, housing, child
care and education benefits to over several hundred thousand employees, pensioners and
dependents." Blumental, supra note 9, at 210.
101. Even after a state worker is laid-off, the state enterprise remains obligated to retrain workers, find them new jobs, and pay their living expenses. Regulations on the Placement of Surplus Staff and Workers of State-owned Enterprises [P.R.C.] (Apr. 20, 1993); see
also supra note 31 (regarding re-employment centers).
102. "During the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that met in
September 1997, PresidentJiang Zemin announced plans to sell, merge, or close the vast
majority of SOE's in his call for increased "non-public ownership." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra note 16, at 9. As of 1999 SOE's employed 24 million people. Id.
103. After all, by 1998, there were nearly 305,000 state-owned enterprises responsible
for the livelihood and welfare of more than 200 million employees, families, and retirees.
Blumental, supra note 9, at 202.
104. See supra note 99.
105. In the early stages of the transition, western observers estimated that China would
need to create a half billion new jobs by the early 21st Century just to maintain an unemployment rate of five percent. Hardt, supra note 87, at VIII. Chinese officials estimate,
perhaps too conservatively, that by the year 2006 there will be twenty millionjobless people
in China. China News Digest, Jobless to Reach 20 Million: Labor Minister, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://cnd.org/Global/02/04/30/020430-l.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). Those
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means by which social welfare benefits were delivered, the precipitous rise in unemployment quite naturally has brought with it a
sudden surge in the demand for extra-market social welfare
10 6
delivery.
Worker displacement and the withdrawal of the iron rice bowl is
also a consequence of other measures mandated by China's entry
into the WTO. China's commitment to eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers-import quotas, prohibitive and discriminatory
license fees, and other protectionist measures 0 7 -will stimulate
competition from foreign vendors of the sort that will punish economic inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies include employing too
many people to do a single job and the maintenance of redundant
firms, both of which result from the iron rice bowl's drive for
autarky and its insistence on full employment;1 0 8 social mergers
and acquisitions; 0 9 credit policies that condone non-performing
loans, many or most of such "policy loans"'110 were made to assist
enterprises in meeting social welfare delivery burdens when revenues were insufficient to do so; and other types of subsidies."'
Foreign competition from individuals and business not burdened
officials also estimate that twelve to thirteen million people will enter the job market during each year from 2002 to 2006, but that the economy is not likely to create more than
eight million jobs over the same period. Id.
106. Blumental, supra note 9, at 2011-12 (discussing, in general, the impact of transition on social welfare, unemployment and social stability).
107. Other non-tariff barriers to trade include restrictive product standards, testing
and certification requirements that are difficult to comply with by foreign businesses.
Bhala, supra note 26, at 1485. For an exhaustive discussion of non-tariff barriers in China,
see JINGZHOU TAO & DIARMUID O'BRIEN, NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS IN CHINA (2003).
108. China doggedly pursued a policy of full employment well into the 1980's and even
after it abandoned that policy in favor of greater managerial flexibility, managers continued to shun layoffs and dismissals because of the administrative burdens that accompanied
such reductions:
Although the reforms in the 1980's endorse firing a person on the grounds of
inability, laziness, or redundancy, few state-run enterprises actually did so until
the mid-1990's. This is in part because of the system's structure: If a unit dismisses an employee, it then must either find that person alternative work or continue to provide the discharged employee with housing and an adequate if
substantially reduced living wage.
OGDEN, supra note 41, at 113.

109. See supra note 68 (regarding the consideration of social welfare factors with regard
to consolidations).
110. Not only do "policy loans" take capital away from more efficient uses, they are also
the source of the Chinese banking system's high level of non-performing loans that, in
turn, threaten the solvency of China's banks. See generally OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 231-258.

111. To survive transition, old, state-run enterprises will be required to "divest themselves of social assets - such as housing, health clinics, and kindergartens." THE WORLD
BANK, supra note 27, at 26.
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by social obligations will discipline many sectors of the Chinese
economy and that discipline will manifest itself primarily by those
sectors limiting their social welfare spending. At the same time,
direct government spending on social welfare must necessarily be
limited because such spending is counterproductive to the nurturance of the market economy. 1t 2 The surging demand for social
welfare will then become a matter of perpetual motion. The era of
the individual profit motive to deliver social welfare will require the
State's withdrawal as the sole and primary provider of social welfare, and that withdrawal will increase the demand for state provided social welfare as unprepared or left behind persons suffer
hardships. The State's failure to respond to increased demand will
create discontent which, in turn, will discourage the government's
determination to allow market forces to provide for social welfare.
Although increased demand may be temporary, it may also become
permanent if the temporary demand is not alleviated in the short
run and is also sufficient to create a backlash against the new market economy.
China's transition to a market economy creates more than just
social welfare consequences. The transition is also generating certain needs more directly related to market economies. The failure
to meet those needs will stimulate just as much risk of transition
failure as do the immediate social welfare consequences. First,
internal and external competition was irrelevant in the iron rice
bowl and, as a result, there was little, if any, reason to strive for
innovation, education, training, labor and capital mobility, and
improved qualities of life. Setting aside military needs, such goals
were sought only to the extent necessary to maintain or achieve the
commune ultimately manifested by the iron rice bowl. 11 3 The
active pursuit of more formal learning and individual betterment,
to the extent those pursuits were separate from political ideology,
was more often viewed as'contrary to "right" thinking or "Maoist
Thought."1 1 4 A market economy, though, is explicitly based on
112. Id. at xvi, 29 (noting the drag on transition economies when state subsidies are
maintained).
113. China embraced the idea of modern technology, new strategies, education and
better training with regard to its military in the late 1970's. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
supra note 16, at 13.

114. Mao viewed the pursuit of material gain - closely related to personal achievement
- as corrupting. BARNETT, supra note 15, at 30. A recurring ideological conflict in China
since 1949 was between "redness" and expert. At times, fervent political ideology was
viewed as sufficient and even superior to technical expertise, and technical expertise was
sometimes viewed with suspicion or as a sign of class inequality. ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at
35-36, 46. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, universities were actually closed
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competition, and is fed by innovation, education, training, opportunity, and mobility, among other things.' t5 China's successful
transition to a market economy therefore requires improvements
in science and technology training, 116 education,"t 7 and labor and
capital mobility.' 18 Labor and capital mobility, in particular, is
important so that competitors can adapt to market demand and
quickly take advantage of new opportunity. 1 9 Both types of mobildown for 4 years. John P. Hardt, supra note 87, at IX. "Senior professors, respected Communist officials, and dedicated scientists suddenly found themselves [during the Cultural
Revolution] paraded with dunce caps and placards, beaten up, subjected to merciless interrogation, and dispatched to tours of hard labor in remote areas." Ashbrook, supra note 31,
at 27.
For an in-depth discussion of China's suspicion and disdain of the intelligentsia immediately after the revolution, see Leo Orleans, China's Science and Technology: Continuity and
Innovation, inJOINT ECON. COMM., 92n CONG., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT 185 (1972).

115. WTO, supra note 27, at 90-94.
116. China's already very low ratio of science and technology research and development (R&D) expenditure to GDP actually experienced a decline in the 1990s.
Furthermore, Chinese enterprises are far from being the leaders in innovation.
China still relies on foreign supply of advanced industrial technologies, and the
lack of domestic progress in this area has further increased reliance on foreign
technology. Poor domestic technological capability could lead to serious structural weaknesses in the Chinese economy.
OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 195.

117. For example, in 1999, less than forty percent of China's rural population (numbering approximately 910 million) had attended junior high school (i.e., fewer than
3,640,000 rural Chinese citizens have attended junior high school). Id. at 549. And less
than five percent of the rural population (i.e., fewer than 6,500,000) had attended high
school. Id. "For these reasons, a rapid expansion of senior secondary and higher education
is highly desirable insofar as it can be afforded .. .China undoubtedly will need to establish many additional institutions for upper secondary and higher education in the near
future, and these should be spread more evenly across the territory than existing ones." Id.
at 549. "Private [tax exempt] universities that respond rapidly and nimbly to the changing
demands of the labour market of the new economy could provide some of the diversity and
flexibility that the Chinese education system will require." Id. at 799.
118. The educational "reforms" imposed during the Cultural Revolution - which have
greatly subsided but are still somewhat present - included abolishing entrance exams,
shortening traditional curriculum and increasing political indoctrination, eliminating all
theoretical study and research unrelated to productive pursuits, and including more productive labor at all levels of education. Orleans, supra note 114, at 198. As a result, though,
of the attacks on "intellectualism" China experienced an "acute shortage" of skilled and
technical expertise, leading the State to take the "audacious" step of sending "large numbers of students abroad to study science and technology in the industrialized capitalist
countries - including the United States, Japan, several Western European countries,
Canada, and Australia." BARNETT, supra note 15, at 3.
119. Of course, in the pre-reform era, the Chinese State did not want individuals' place
of residence or occupation to be influenced by market conditions but determined instead
by socialist planning. The hukou system served to override economic motivations:
China's resource endowments were characterized as capital-scarce but laborabundant. The economy was largely agrarian in the early days of the PRC. Influenced by the Soviet model, China placed high priority on heavy industry to speed
up its industrialization. In order to finance the expansion of heavy industry, the
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ity are hampered by the inability of the social welfare system to
deliver goods and services to burgeoning populations, the mobility
of which is important to the market economy. For example, China
continues to maintain artificial barriers to internal migration
because of fears that people will move to and overcrowd areas
offering the best opportunities relative to their skills, needs, and
preferences. Likewise, surplus capital continues to be tied up in
loss generating investments because to immediately withdraw capital from state-owned enterprises would drastically and suddenly
increase the demands for social welfare. Even if China's social welfare delivery system were to remain as omnipotent during and after
transition-a possibility that is inherently inconsistent with a
mature market economy-the transition would nevertheless create
other economic needs that, unmet, would generate serious challenge to the permanence of the market economy. Altruistic investment, such as occurs when people contribute to colleges,
universities, hospitals, and cultural organizations, can address all of
the foregoing needs.
A final resulting need with regard to China's transition to a market economy involves stemming what has been referred to as the
"brain drain." As China becomes more successful in stimulating
the education and training necessary to successfully compete in a
global capitalist system, it will need to provide its educated and
trained citizens with incentives to remain in those areas most lacking in skilled labor. 120 Observers have previously noted that a large
percentage of Chinese people who receive advanced education
either leave or, with regard to those who are educated abroad, do
not return to China.' 2 1 This phenomenon is attributed to the relative lack of cultural and other quality of life amenities, the demand
for which is no doubt stimulated by education and training. 1 22 In
contrast to the strictly economic goal of a market economy, there
state underpriced agricultural products and overpriced industrial products to
induce unequal exchange between the agricultural and industrial sectors. To
maintain this artificial imbalance under the condition of dual economy, the state
had to create a system which blocked free flows of resources (including labor)
between industry and agriculture and between city and the countryside.
CHAN & ZHANG, supra note 61, at 3.
120. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 212 (discussing the major
"brain drain" from China over the last two decades).
121. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that most Chinese students
who study abroad do not return, though they do increase opportunities for international
contacts with China from the host country).
122. On the other hand, the U.S. - China Security Commission views the presence of
large numbers of Chinese scholars as a troubling source of technology transfer from the
United States to China. U.S. - CHINA SECUtRr- REvIEW COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 10.
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109

should be a sort of autarkic policy with respect to individual cultural, educational, and entertainment preferences. Redundancies
across regions with regard to cultural, educational, and entertainment opportunities reduce incentives for over-migration to more
culturally diverse coastal or urban areas,1 23 those that are most
likely to already have sufficient sources of skilled and educated
124
human capital.
Altruistic investment is, as has been shown, entirely irrelevant in
a society that maintains an omnipotent and inviolate social welfare
delivery system. It should not be surprising, then, that modern
China lacks any tradition of altruistic investment. On the other
hand, altruistic investment is both relevant and necessary in a market economy that disdains welfare, but instead relies on self-serving
pursuit of profit and the inequalities such pursuits invariably create. Because socialism and capitalism are mutually exclusive, competitive market-based economies necessarily create pockets of
absolute poverty, even as they increase the efficient delivery of
goods and services for most people. Nonetheless, in the absence of
absolute poverty social inequalities can lead to resentment and
social disorder, though perhaps to a lesser degree than absolute
poverty. 125 Altruistic investment is thus relevant in a market economy not only as a tool to address absolute poverty, but also to
address resentments from relative poverty as well. While the primary effect of altruistic investment is to ensure, or at least increase
the social order upon which the market economy depends for its
continued existence, altruistic investment also assists with the
maintenance of the market economy by helping provide educated
and skilled labor, as well as technological innovations. China's
headlong pursuit of a market economy, with the United States'
encouragement, creates the relevancy and necessity for altruistic
126
investment if the market economy is to succeed.
123. For a complete discussion of the growing financial and cultural inequalities as
between urban and costal regions, and rural and central regions see OECD, CHINA IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY,

supra note 46, at 679-87.

124. The service sector provides a variety of crucial functions - the distributive
infrastructure for extractive and manufactured goods, financing for enterprises,
the administrative functions that enable a society to exist, the maintenance and
recycling (renting/leasing) facilities for durable goods and the activities (health,
education, recreation) that enhance the quality of the labourforce.
Id. at 130 [emphasis added].
125. "The fact that during the reform era China has experienced an exceptional
increase in [income] inequality is cause for concern." Id. at 109.
126. How can social policies support a [transition economy]? By targeting social
safety nets to the most vulnerable, such as those affected by the increase in utility
prices and by the labor shedding resulting from hard budget constraints on enter-
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The next Section shows that the two countries share a common
approach to the stimulation of altruistic investment. However,
both countries ignore and in certain ways even discourage international altruistic investment. After reviewing the technical rules that
prove these points the Article considers why both countries might
rationally decide not to alter the present state of affairs, and then
proposes a course of action that would be helpful if both countries
sought to reverse the present state of affairs.

IV.

TAX INCENTIVES FOR ALTRUISTIC INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS

The two previous sections present the case for altruistic investment in China. It should be noted, though, that while altruistic
investment is an ultimately self-serving activity, the reward or yield
from an altruistic investment is not at all obvious. It is therefore
not unreasonable for individuals to ignore altruistic investment.
There are a variety of other investments, especially in a market
economy, from which individuals may obtain more immediate, less
remote and uncertain yields. The challenge, then, is to transform
altruism from an abstract, long-term investment to one that is more
short-term and concrete. Providing a tax benefit to altruistic investors is the most common way to accomplish this goal in capitalist
economies.1 2 7 The U.S. tax code adopted this approach nearly one
hundred years ago. The Chinese have only more recently published a set of tax laws but those laws appear to adopt the approach
of creating immediate financial incentives for altruistic investment.
While both countries have sought to coordinate their efforts in
establishing the Chinese capitalist economy, they have not sought
to coordinate their respective pursuits of altruistic investment.
This Section describes each country's tax laws as they pertain to
altruistic investment. The description includes references to barriers to the efficient operation of tax incentives in both countries,
particularly those barriers relating to altruistic investment by Amerprises. By helping local governments take over divested social services previously
provided by enterprises, such as housing, kindergartens, and clinics, to permit
enterprise restructuring to go ahead. And by reforming expenditures on education and health to allow workers to acquire skills more adapted to new market
realities and, more generally, to ensure that the benefits of growth, once it
resumes, are widely shared.
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at 81.

127. For a summary of the world's tax laws pertaining to altruistic investment, see
Infanti, supra note 22.
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icans in China.' 28 The following Section acknowledges and discusses reasons why both countries might want to maintain those
barriers and then provides a possible means by which the two countries could encourage altruistic investment without necessarily sacrificing their differing long term goals.
A.

Survey of Chinese Tax Incentives for Altruistic Investment

1. Tax Incentives for Individual Altruistic Investment
What will be referred to as the Chinese tax code consists of five
different taxing statutes: the Individual Income Tax, Enterprise
Income Tax, Value Added Tax, Business Tax, and Consumption
Tax. The first, the "Individual Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China" (Individual Income Tax Law), imposes a tax on
"individual income," a phrase that is apparently defined in the
same manner as "gross income" in the U.S. tax code. 129 The Individual Income Tax Law appears to reach all forms of accessions to
wealth not specifically exempted from taxation. Article 6 of the
Individual Income Tax Law authorizes a deduction from taxable
income for donations to "educational and other public welfare
undertakings."'130 The "Detailed Rules for the Implementation of
the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China"
(Individual Income Tax Regulations) specify that the deduction
cannot exceed thirty percent of a taxpayer's taxable income, but
they do not provide for a carryover of excess donations. 13 1 The
failure to provide for carryovers, of course, discourages larger onetime donations in excess of thirty percent of a donor's taxable
income because the excess can never be deducted. Neither the
Individual Income Tax Law nor Regulations define "educational
and other public welfare undertakings," though the Income Tax
Regulations specify that donations made to social organizations or
government organs for disaster or poverty relief qualify for the
1 32
deduction.
128. "Despite the importance of charitable giving for international purposes, significant limitations are imposed by the U.S. tax system." Change et al., supra note 6, at 563-64.
129. See also Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the
People's Republic of China, arts. 5, 8 (1994) (defining income to include wages and payments
for services, rental income, gains derived from dealings in property, royalties, interest, and
dividends, and income from the conduct of business) [hereinafter Rules for the Implementation of Individual Income Tax].
130. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 6 (1999).
131. Rules for the Implementation of Individual Income Tax, art. 24 (1994).
132. Id.
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Similarly, the "Provisional Rules of the People's Republic of
China on Enterprise Income Tax" (Enterprise Income Tax) subject the income of "enterprises" to a flat thirty-three percent tax.
Article 6 provides for a deduction for "donations used for public
welfare and relief purposes." The deduction is limited to three
percent of the enterprise's taxable income. The "Enterprise
Income Tax Implementing Rules" (Enterprise Income Tax Rules)
provide a bit more guidance with regard to the donation deduction than do the Individual Income Tax Law and Regulations. In
particular, Article 12 states:
Donations used for public welfare and relief purposes . . . shall
refer to donations made by taxpayers to educational, civil
administration and other public welfare undertakings, as well as
to areas suffering from severe natural disasters or poverty
stricken areas through non-profit-making social organizations,
or government organs in China. Donations made directly to
donees by taxpayers shall not be permitted to be deducted.
Article 12 continues by defining "social organizations" as "public
welfare organizations established with the approval of civil administration organs."
The Enterprise Income Tax does not apply to business owned in
whole or part by foreign persons. Those businesses are instead
taxed under "The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign
Enterprise" (Foreign Enterprise Tax Law).1 33 Parity exists nevertheless between domestic and foreign business with regard to altruistic investment because the Foreign Enterprise Tax Law similarly
provides for a contribution deduction of up to three percent of
taxable income.1 34 Jurisdiction under the Foreign Enterprise Tax
Law is triggered when a Chinese-foreign joint venture or wholly
foreign-owned enterprise creates an "establishment" in China. 135
Significantly, the Chinese State Administration of Taxation (SAT)
has held in an administrative ruling that foreign non-profit organizations that are recognized as tax exempt in their home country
may be granted tax exempt status in China solely on the basis of
133. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprise (1991).
134. Neither the Foreign Enterprise Tax Law nor the implementing regulations specify
that the deduction is limited to three percent. See generally OWEN D. NEE, JR. ET AL., BusiNESS OPERATIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, at A-46 n.213 (Tax Mgmt., Foreign
Income Series No. 957-2d, 2001).
135. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprise, art. 2 (1991).
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their home country tax exempt. 136 At least in theory, then, China
has a formal and broadly stated mutual recognition provision in its
tax laws. A U.S. charity, according to the administrative ruling,
need only present its determination letter to the SAT and thereaf137
ter be accorded tax exempt status in China.
As is apparent, neither the Individual Income Tax Law or Regulations nor the Enterprise Income Tax or Regulations sufficiently
define the type of organizations to which donations will generate a
deduction. The recently adopted "Public Welfare Donation
Law,' 3 8 (Welfare Donation Law) however, provides an apparently
non-exclusive list of activities which would lead to the treatment of
an organization as one to which donations would generate a
deduction. These activities include disaster and poverty relief, education, scientific, cultural, public health and athletic activities, environmental protection and construction of public facilities, and
"other public welfare undertakings promoting social development
and progress." 39 This broad definition is nearly identical, in
effect, to that found in the U.S. tax code's definition of organiza140
tions to which contributions generate a deduction.
In addition to the Individual and Enterprise Income Taxes,
China imposes national sales and import taxes on goods and certain services relating to repair of goods. China's value added tax
(VAT) is essentially a seventeen percent tax on value added, that is,
"the difference between the value of a firm's sales and the value of
1 41
the purchased material inputs used in producing goods sold."
Certain goods normally associated with altruistic investment are
exempt from VAT. These include "instruments and equipment
imported for direct use with scientific research or experiments,
and teaching," and "goods imported as gratuitous aid from foreign
governments and international organizations." 142 Perhaps the
most detailed and broadest statement of tax exemption in Chinese
law is contained in the "Provisional Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Business Tax" (Business Tax Law). That stat136. Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on issues Concerning Improvement of Taxation Collection Administration for Foreign Enterprises Resident Representative Offices, art. I(II) (Sept. 13, 1996) (stating that foreign "nonprofit" organizations will
not be subject to tax in China).
137. Id.
138. Welfare Donations Law of the People's Republic of China (1999).
139. Id. at ch. 1, art. 3 (1999).
140. Cf I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1986).
141. Provisional Value-Added Tax Regulations of the People's Republic of China, art. 2
(1994).
142. Id. art. 16 (1994).
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ute imposes what is essentially a sales tax on services that are not
covered by VAT. The following services, however, are specifically
exempted from the Business Tax and, because those services are
not covered by VAT, they are effectively exempt from all national
sales taxes:
(1) educational and nursing services rendered by nurseries, kindergartens, homes for senior citizens, and welfare organizations for disabled persons, matchmaking agencies and
funeral homes;
(2) services rendered by individual disabled persons;
(3) medical services rendered by hospitals, clinics or other medical institutions;
(4) educational services rendered by schools or other educational institutions; services rendered by students under the
work-study program;
(5) businesses related to mechanized cultivation, irrigation and
drainage, pests prevention and control measures, plant protection, farming and animal husbandry insurance, and any
related technical training businesses, breeding and disease
prevention for domesticated animals, livestock and aquatic
animals;
(6) income obtained from sale of tickets for cultural activities
held by memorial halls, museums, cultural centers, art institutes, exhibition halls, Chinese calligraphy and painting
centers, libraries, and units in charge of protection of cultural relics, and income obtained from sale of tickets for
14 3
cultural and religious activities held at religious centers.
B.

Incentives for Collective Altruism

Making sense of China's approach to altruistic organizations
seems like an almost hopeless endeavor until one suddenly realizes
that privately conceived and operated altruistic organizations are
virtually nonexistent in China. Yet groups routinely referred to as
"nongovernmental organizations" comprising "civil society" are
said to number between 70,000 and 180,000 in China.1 44 In reality,
the vast majority of those organizations are more accurately
143. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Business Tax, art. 6
(1994).
144. OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 370 (stating that there
are 70,000 NGO's in China); see also CHUNYING & YE, supra note 54, at 90-91 (stating that
there were 180,538 registered NGO's and NPO's in China as of 1995, but also stating that
Chinese NGO's and NPO's are not equivalent to western style organizations because there
is no clear demarcation between government and non-governmental organizations). The
most official estimate of what are described as "nongovernmental" organizations puts the
number at 165,600. Guangyao Chen, Deputy Bureau Director, Nongovernmental Organizations Administrative Bureau, China's Nongovernmental Organizations: Status, Government Policies, and Prospects for Further Development, Address Before the World
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described as government auxiliaries. 45 They are thoroughly conceived, born, staffed, operated, and controlled by and in accordance with various government agencies and policies.1 4 6 They
exist not to provide policies or means of social welfare delivery
alternate to government or business, but solely to extend such policies and delivery systems without deviation from the ways and
means of government. 14 7 The use of the label "nongovernmental
organization" is therefore as much a confusing misnomer 148 as the
phrase "independent sector" would be if applied to such organizations. There is simply no real community of private social organizations in China at the present time. 149 Nevertheless, an
understanding of these "government-nongovernment organizations," as one Chinese writer candidly calls them, 5 0 furthers an
understanding of China's approach to truly private charitable organizations. 1 5 1 As further explained below, the suspicion animating
China's State supervision of government-nongovernment organizaCongress of Association Executives (Aug. 12, 2000) (transcript available at http://
www.icnl.org/journal/vol3iss3/arguangyao.htm) (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
145. After the CCP took power, the three main organizations that would most likely be
referred to as nonprofit organizations were the Trade Union, the Youth League, and the
Women's Federation. CHUNYING &YE, supra note 54, at 87. Chinese scholars candidly note,
however, that these organizations were "in reality peripheral organizations of the Party.
The Trade Union and Women's Federation became 'assistants to the party,' and the Youth
Federation became both 'the assistant and the reserve of the party."' Id.
146. "NGOs and NPOs [are] not pure citizens' groups, independent of the government." Instead, they are "given the responsibility of carrying out some of the Party's and
government's policies. Chinese NGOs and NPOs served as intermediaries between the
political system and civil society or as supplements to government bodies. Id. at 88.
147. Zhao, supra note 55 ("most social organizations are controlled by the Chinese
government, and few are genuine NGOs").
148. The term "NGO" is a misnomer, because, while some of these bodies are
private, particularly those concerned with environmental protection, health care,
education for poor children, women's issues, and rural development, most are
privatized state-owned NGOs, such as trade unions, the Chamber of commerce,
and the All-China Women's Federation.

OECD,

CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY,

supra note 46, at 370.

149. But see Lee, supra note 20, at 378 (concluding, without explanation, that "the close
nexus between government actors and NGOs does not mean that Chinese NGOs are nothing more than unofficial extensions of the state").
150.

Zhao, supra note 55.
151. One American scholar divides Chinese civil society into four groups: (1) mass
organizations that play an "officially sanctioned political role" - an historical European
example of notorious distinction would be the Hider Youth; (2) social organizations,
which include business groups, cultural clubs and academic societies; (3) unofficially
groups the State informally condones, such as "lineage associations"; and (4) unofficial
groups the government seeks to suppress, such as adherents of Falun Gong. See Lee, supra
note 20, at 376.
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tions helps explain its reluctance to support and advance the formation of a truly independent sector. 52
China's enabling law for government-nongovernment organizations is entitled "Regulations on the Registration and Management
of Social Organizations" (Social Organization Law)' 53 and it is simple yet deceptive in its implications. While it does not affirmatively
define those activities that justify classification as a "social organization" it prohibits such organizations from engaging in profit-making activities. 5 4 Recall, too, that both the Welfare Donation Law
and the Enterprise Tax Law define activities of organizations donations to which generate a tax deduction. It would seem logical that
the definitions in those laws would apply or at least influence the
interpretation of the term, "social organization" under the Social
Organization Law. The striking additional feature added by the
Social Organization Law, and the one that creates the oxymoronic
nature of government-nongovernment organizations is that social
organizations claiming legal status under the Social Organization
Law must seek the approval and submit to the supervision of a
"professional responsible authority." 55 Sparse, but relevant literature confirms that this requirement provides the mechanism by
which the State can exercise central planning of the sort previously
utilized with respect to all other aspects of Chinese life. 156 As it
turns out, the "professional responsible authority" is actually a government department and it is that department that sets the social
organization's agenda and ensures that the organization adheres
to that agenda.' 57 This explicit reservation of authority illustrates
the stark difference between Chinese social organizations and
organizations that comprise the independent sector in most other
countries.
152. "The leaders of the Chinese government are very cautious towards any movement
in this newly emerging sector. They are on guard against any threats to the political stability and social order in China." Zhao, supra note 55.
153. Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (1989),
reprinted in CHUNMING & YE, supra note 54, at 110.
154. Id. art. 4.
155. Id. art. 9.
156. To be registered, a social organization must first be affiliated with a government line agency. Such linkage can occur when a government agency takes the
initiative to set up an association or foundation to supplement its role. Or a
group of people, interested in a particular task and with funds to do the work, can
approach a government organization whose work is similar to their interests and
seek support and protection. With the support and approval of a line agency, a
social organization can then apply for legal registration.
CHUNYING & YE, supra note 54, at 94.
157. Id.
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The same broad implication is present in a more recently
enacted law designed, ostensibly, to encourage "private" nongovernmental organizations. Such organizations, too, must seek and
submit to the approval and regulation of a competent business
unit. 1 58 As with the Social Organization Law, the Private Social
Organization Law's use of "competent business unit"15 9 actually
refers to a government agency that is empowered to supervise the
organization's activities. 160 Thus, altruistic organizations that are
conceived and organized by private citizens must nevertheless find
a government agency willing to act not only as their sponsor but
also as the State's watchdog and veto authority over the private
organizations' activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this
requirement creates an insurmountable barrier to the growth of a
truly independent sector in China. 16 1 Most government agency
personnel reject applications for exemptions from private organizations because they do not want the responsibility of supervising
the organization and they fear that the organization's extra-governmental, potentially subversive activities will be attributed to
them. 162 One Chinese scholar candidly admits that "there is not
much possibility" for the creation of private charitable organizations in China. 163 This prognosis is attributable to the belief, candidly articulated by Chinese scholars, that private social
organizations contain "threatening elements."' 164 Quite curiously,
158. Zhao, supra note 55.
159. The Interim Provisions on the Registration and Administration of Private Nonenterprise Units, ch. I, arts. 3, 5 (1999).
160. Zhao, supra note 55.
161. Id. The Interim Provisions on the Registration and Administration of Private Nonenterprise Units requires that an application for recognition be rejected if there is evidence that the organization might endanger reunification [apparently referring to Taiwan], cause social unrest or breech social ethics and morality." The Interim Provisions on
the Registration and Administration of Private Non-enterprise Units, ch. I, art. 11 (1999).
162. China's Charity Case, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 20, 2001, at WI ("Official agencies
don't want to take the opportunity for private nonprofits because it is bothersome and if
something goes wrong, officials will lose their posts.").
163. Zhao, supra note 55. The writer goes on to state:
Chinese NGO's should become independent in society, but keep a close, cooperative relationship with the government. They should be friends, partners, and
collaborators of the government. By that time, the government will not worry too
much about negative possibilities with a NGO sector as before. The crucial time
for the Chinese government to release strict control on private NGO's will be
coming, and the current provisional regulations concerning the NGO sector will
be replaced by relevant laws which are rational, sound and permanent. The NGO
sector combined with the market sector and the state sector in China will play its
ideographic role in China as well as in global sustainable development.
164.

Id.
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though, even the government-nongovernment organizations have
been described by Chinese authorities as "congenitally defective"1 65
precisely because they are too dependent on government.
Whatever the import of this seeming schizophrenia, 66 the broader
implication arising from the Chinese approach is that the State will
take a dimmer and more restrictive approach to foreign altruistic
organizations seeking legal status in China. Indeed, while the government has stated its intention to enact a law pertaining to foreign charitable organizations, it has yet to do so. 1 6 7
C.
1.

Survey of U.S. Tax Incentives for Altruistic Investment

Incentives for Individual Altruistic Investment

Although the U.S. tax code's approach to altruistic investment is
nearly one hundred years old, it is nevertheless subject to ambiguity and controversy. Both the ambiguity and continuing controversy result primarily from the complexity of I.R.C. § 170, a
complexity that invariably acts as a disincentive for charitable giving. 168 The effect is amplified when altruistic investment is made
across international boundaries. Rules directly pertaining to crossborder altruistic investment, though they are not so very complex,
simply magnify the negative effect to a greater extent. A brief overview of the authorizing and limiting provisions contained in the
U.S. code suffices to prove these contentions.
Under the U.S. tax code, individuals may deduct charitable contributions to public charities and certain other specified recipients
to the extent such contributions do not exceed fifty percent of
their adjusted gross income. 169 For corporations, however, the
charitable contribution is limited to ten percent of taxable
income.1 70 Contributions to private foundations are deductible at
165. Chen, supra note 144.
166. While on the one hand Chinese officials complain that Chinese NGO's are too
dependent on government, on the other they state: "The Chinese government will hold
fast to the principle of 'scientific planning, correct guidance, improved legal framework,
and normalized development' to develop and nurture China's NGOs." Id.

167. Id.
168. For a thorough and still timely discussion of the complexities and disincentives in
the U.S. Tax code provisions relating to altruistic investment (charitable contributions and
charitable organizations), see C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple
and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for CharitableContributionsand CharitableOrganizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 339 (1995).
169. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1986).
170. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1986).
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rates of thirty percent 71 and ten percent 172 for individuals and corporations, respectively. One significant incentive for both individual and corporate altruistic investors is that if a donor owns
property for more than twelve months prior to the donation, the
amount of the deduction will equal the fair market value of the
property. 173 That is, a donor can escape taxation of the appreciation in the property and still earn a tax deduction for that appreciation. Two complicating factors potentially act as disincentives for
cross-border altruistic investment in this regard. First, the appreciation in the property is not deductible if the contribution is made
to a private foundation 74 and second, the appreciation is not
deductible if the property is unrelated to a public charity's charitable goals.' 75 Both limitations create potential bias against cross
border giving, although the former limitation does so to a greater
extent. This is because a foreign recipient is more likely to be classified as a private foundation. t 76 Note that these rules apply only to
in-kind contributions. Contributions of long-term appreciated
property is therefore more advantageous for the altruistic investor
than is a contribution of cash, because the cash will likely have
been subject to taxation in the hands of the donor prior to its contribution. 77 An investor seeking a deduction equal to the before
tax fair market value of her contribution is therefore better advised
to invest appreciated property domestically rather than internationally. An overall disincentive to individual, but not corporate,
altruism is that the deduction is available only to those individual
taxpayers who forego the standard deduction and instead itemize
their deductions.178 Because relatively few individuals itemize, the
charitable contribution is considered generally ineffective as a
79
motivator of individual altruistic investment.
There are even more explicit disincentives to international altruistic investment, whether individual or corporate. Since 1935 the
171. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (1986).
172. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1986).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (2002).
174. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1986).
175. I.R.C. § 170(e) (1) (B) (i) (1986).
176. See I.R.C. § 508(b) (charitable organizations not recognized by the IRS are presumed to be private foundations).
177. A cash gift that is later donated to a charitable organization would not have been
subjected to tax in the donor's hands. See I.R.C. § 108 (1986).
178. I.R.C. § 63(a) (1986).
179. STAFF OFJoINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 39, at 7-10
(summarizing the evidence in support of the notion that providing a deduction for nonitemizers would increase charitable giving).
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U.S. tax code has imposed geographical limitations on the recipient's place of origin. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2) (A) requires that a recipient organization be created or organized under U.S. domestic
law. 18 0 Contributions directly to a foreign charity-that is, a charity
organized under the authority of a non-domestic law-are not
deductible." t The geographical limitation has never been
enforced beyond the requirement that a foreign charity apply for
recognition in the United States. Contributions to a domestic
organization generates a tax deduction even if all parties to the
transaction expect that the contribution will be used in a foreign
country. 182 The geographical limitation still requires that the
recipient organization undertake the time and expense of seeking
legal recognition in a domestic jurisdiction, as well as submit to the
regulation of that jurisdiction. A Chinese altruistic organization
seeking U.S. investors would need to either apply for legal status in
the United States or establish a relationship with a domestic organization that, in turn, transferred donations made to the domestic
organization to the Chinese organization. 183 As a practical matter,
then, the geographical limitation probably removes the most grass
roots of organizations from gaining access to U.S. altruistic
investment.
For corporate taxpayers, the geographical limitation is even
more stringent, yet also surmountable via a curious loophole in
I.R.C. § 170. Like individual altruistic investment, corporate altruistic investment generates a deduction only if made to a domestically recognized organization. In addition, the investment must
actually be used domestically, but only if the investment is made to
a "trust, chest, fund, or foundation."' 8 4 For reasons never adequately explained, a corporate investor is entitled to a deduction
180. For a history of the geographical limitations of I.R.C. § 170, see Change et al.,
supra note 6, at 568.
181. The stated justification for the restriction was that the United States gained no
benefit from extra-territorial donations. H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19-20 (1938).
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-A-8(a)(1) (2002) ("A charitable contribution by an individual
to an organization described in section 170(c) is deductible even though all, or some portion, of the funds of the organization may be used in foreign countries for charitable or
educational purposes."). As long as a domestic organization is not required to use donations in a foreign country, donations to the organizations will be considered made to a
domestic organization even if the organization is expected to and ultimately decides to use
the donation in a foreign country. Rev. Rul. 63-235, 1963-2 C.B. 210; Rev. Rul. 66-79, 19661 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79. Thus, donations to an organization entitled,
"Friends of China" would be deductible if the organization is organized under domestic
law even if the donation is to be used, at the organization's sole discretion, in China.
183. See id.
184. I.R.C. § 17 0(c) (1986).
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regardless of where the investment is used if the recipient is something other than a trust, chest, fund, or foundation. 8 5 If the recipient is a corporation, then the investment may be used anywhere in
the world and the corporate investor will nevertheless be entitled
to a deduction. 8 6 Again, as a practical matter, the truly grass roots
organizations-those that do not bother or are not sophisticated
enough to form a domestic corporation-are essentially excluded
from another source of international altruistic investment.
Another barrier, though not as explicit, to the receipt of corporate donations arises from the application of the foreign tax
credit.' 8 7 A U.S. multinational corporation is entitled to claim a
credit against its taxable income for taxes paid to a foreign government. That credit in any one year is limited to a figure derived by
multiplying the corporation's tax rate by the corporation's taxable
income from foreign sources.' 8 Consequently, the more foreign
source taxable income a corporation has, the larger its foreign tax
credit will be. Foreign source taxable income is reduced, however,
to the extent that a charitable contribution is used in the foreign
jurisdiction. Under proposed regulations, if a corporation knows
or has reason to know that a charitable contribution is to be used
solely in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign source income must be
reduced by the deductible amount thereof. 18 9 As a result, a corporate altruistic investor gets a higher yield when its charitable contribution is designated solely for use in the United States. In such
instances, it may claim both the charitable contribution deduction
and the undiminished foreign tax credit, resulting in a higher
after-tax yield. Further, if a taxpayer is unable to claim credit for
all foreign taxes in any one year, the taxpayer may claim the excess
as a credit for the prior two, and succeeding five years, subject to
the same overall limitation.1 90 A corporation in such an "excess
credit" position would gain less by making foreign use charitable
contributions during those carryback or carryover years than it
would if it restricted its altruistic investments to domestic causes. If
nothing else, the foreign tax credit limitation encourages sporadic,
as opposed to regular and annual, international altruistic
investments.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Change et al., supra note 6, at 584-85.
I.R.C. § 901(a) (1986).
Id.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e) (12), 56 Fed. Reg. 10,395 (Mar. 12, 1991).
I.R.C. § 904(c) (1986).
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The effect of the allocation rules with respect to corporate charitable contribution is to create an indirect disincentive for international altruistic investment. 19 1 The disincentive results from the
fact that domestic altruistic investment, all other things being
equal, will result in a higher yield. A similar disincentive applies
with respect to certain U.S. domestic tax exempt charities that want
to make international altruistic investments. Recall that as a practical matter, it is exceedingly difficult for a private nonprofit organization to gain legal recognition and thereafter conduct tax free
charitable operations in China. 19 2 One alternative would be for
the U.S. nonprofit organization to conduct such operations indirectly by providing grants and other funding to Chinese "friends
of' organizations. 193 That is, a U.S. nonprofit organization could
altruistically invest in a Chinese organization organized under U.S.
domestic law for the purpose of making altruistic investments in
China. Indeed, this is the most available option for U.S. individuals and organizations in light of the geographical limitations of
I.R.C. § 170 and the lack of any Chinese legal structure or desire
for the recognition of foreign nonprofit organizations. The U.S.
nonprofit organizations that would most effectively utilize this
alternative are known as nonoperating private foundations. Essentially, these are nonprofit organizations that are neither the recipient of widespread public donations nor directly engaged in
charitable activities. 194 Instead, nonoperating private foundations
are funded by a relatively small number of individuals and conduct
charitable activities indirectly, by funding other altruistic organizations or by making grants to individuals. Typically, though not uniformly, private foundations are wealthier than other U.S.
charitable organizations and thus represent a significant source of
altruistic investment.
There are two tax statutes, however, that create disincentives for
private foundations seeking to make international altruistic investments. The first, I.R.C. § 4942, requires that nonoperating private
foundations annually distribute at least five percent of the net
value of their assets held for investment (noncharitable assets),
rather than for direct use in a charitable activity. A violation of that
requirement subjects a foundation to a tax equal to first, fifteen,
191. Change et al., supra note 6, at 588 (international charities "feared that the new
regulation increased the marginal benefit of giving to U.S. charities and would thus reduce
corporate funding of international charities[ ]").
192. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 182.
194. See generally I.R.C. § 509 (1986).
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and then one hundred percent of the amount by which annual
distributions fall short of the five percent requirement.1 95 Because
nonoperating foundations do not directly engage in charitable
activities, the value of noncharitable assets and the minimum payout for any year are normally relatively high. On the other hand,
private foundations stereotypically prefer large endowments, a
preference that is inconsistent with high annual spending or distributions. 196 Distributions to organizations that are not recognized
as U.S. public charities do not count towards the five percent payout required by I.R.C. § 4942.197 Foreign organizations are naturally less likely to apply for recognition in the United States.1 98 As a
result private foundations are less likely to make international
altruistic investments and more likely to make distributions to
domestic organizations since the former investments do not help
them meet the five percent payout requirement.
The second tax statute that creates a disincentive for international altruistic investment by private foundations is I.R.C. § 4945,
99
which imposes a similar two tier tax on "taxable expenditures."'
Significantly, the tax applies if a foundation makes any payment to
20 0
an organization that is not recognized as a U.S. public charity.
The section 4945 tax, as with the I.R.C. § 4942 tax, would presumptively apply whenever a private foundation transfers wealth to a
Chinese social organization that is not recognized as a public charity under U.S. law.
Private Foundations can avoid the section 4942 and 4945 taxes
by making an "informed" decision based upon sufficient financial
data that the recipient qualifies for public charity status under U.S.
law, even though the recipient has not actually applied for such
status. 20 1 If the private foundation cannot make such a determination, it may still avoid the I.R.C. § 4945 tax by exercising continuing administrative oversight - "expenditure responsibility" - over
the recipient's use of any payments received from the private foun195.

I.R.C. § 4942(a)-(b) (1986).

196. See Maverick Charities Boost Donations to Attack Ills Now, WALL STREET J., Sept. 10,
2002, at Al (noting that private foundation assets have increased while charitable giving
has decreased since 1981, and that most foundations prefer to accumulate large endowments over immediate spending).
197. I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1) (1986).
198. See Harvey Dale, Foreign Charities,48 TAx LAW. 655, 658 (1995).
199. I.R.C. § 4945(a)-(b). The tax is 10% of the expenditure, followed by a 100% tax if
the expenditure is not corrected within a certain period of time.
200. I.R.C. § 4945(d).
201. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-46 I.R.B. 34.
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dation. 20 2 Expenditure responsibility, though, is rather burdensome even with regard to a domestic recipient and most private
foundations seek to avoid that method of escaping the I.R.C.
§ 4945 tax. 203 In any event, the presumptive applicability of the
taxes and the need for administrative measures or oversight to
avoid the taxes make international altruistic investment riskier and
more costly, thus resulting in a lower yield than an otherwise
equivalent domestic altruistic investment.
Because the yield on altruistic investments is obscure, governments that wish to stimulate such investments need to create an
obvious reward that renders such investments competitive with
other available investments. Both the United States and China
have sought to do so domestically through their tax codes, though
the United States has a much longer history in this regard. Both
countries also seem somewhat schizophrenic towards the idea of
international altruistic investment. China has no provision at all
with regard to its citizens taking a deduction for contributions to
be used outside of China, and discourages, at best, foreign altruistic investors. The United States grants a deduction for cross border investments but only in a manner that makes such
international altruistic investments less attractive relative to other
forms of investments. Both countries are actively encouraging
cross-border economic investments in China but they both seem
nervous and ambivalent regarding altruistic investment in China,
even though such investments would assist China's more rapid and
successful transition to a market economy. The next Section discusses some of the reasons why both countries might hesitate to
change this situation. It then offers some suggestions for addressing the neglect of altruistic investment while taking into account
the reasons for the initial hesitancy.
V.

REASONS FOR BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL ALTRUISTIC
INVESTMENT IN

CHINA

Whenever the United States has found it advantageous to
encourage international altruistic investment, it has adopted and
implemented a clear treaty mechanism by which to do so. There
are only three such treaties in existence. Nevertheless, those trea-

202.
203.

I.R.C. § 4945(h) (1986).
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b) (2002).
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ties-with Canada, 20 4 Mexico, 20 5 and Israel 206 -manifest a certain
recognition with regard to altruistic investment and U.S. self-interest. Each treaty provides a mechanism that supports international
altruistic investment by (1) granting a U.S. deduction for contributions made to entities organized under the foreign country's laws,
and (2) allowing for U.S. recognition of foreign altruistic organizations based upon their recognition under the foreign country's
laws and without requiring those organizations to organize under
U.S. domestic law. The treaty with Canada is most likely related to
fostering open borders, signifying the historically symbiotic relationship between the United States and Canada. The treaty with
Israel, obviously, is based upon complex religious and geopolitical
factors that apparently make such a treaty advantageous to the
United States. The motivations for the treaty with Mexico, though,
are most analogous to the motivations that might justify encouraging altruistic investment in China. Altruistic investment in Mexico
can assist in bringing about a better economic environment in
Mexico and thus pay dividends in the form of less legal and illegal
immigration into the United States.
China, too, has demonstrated the ease with which it encourages
international altruistic investment when such investment is in its
self-interest. The Red Cross Law of China, granting legal recognition to the International Society of the Red Cross, is but one example. Other ad hoc encouragement of altruistic investment includes
programs such as the "Smile Train," through which Western volunteers provide treatment to Chinese children suffering from cleft lip
and cleft palate. 207 Unlike the United States, China has a reciprocity statute that grants domestic recognition and tax exemption to
foreign charitable organizations, based on the organization's recognition in its home country, although in practice such recognition and tax exemption is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve. 20 8 Thus, when self-interests dictate, both countries have
demonstrated mechanisms by which to stimulate international
altruistic investment.
204. Convention With Respect to Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art.
XXI, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1901, 1901.21 (1990).
205. Convention For Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
With Respect to Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art 22, reprinted in 3 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 5903, 5903.24 (1990).
206. Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Isr., Nov. 20, 1975, art. 15A,
reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 4603, 4603.32 (1990).
207. See The Smile Train Website, http://smiletrain.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2004);
www.edu.cn/20020322/3023300.shtml (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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One should wonder why both countries are hesitant to
encourage such investments between their countries. There must
be countervailing interests that cause the United States and China
to ignore or discourage international altruistic investment. In this
Section, I hypothesize as to those countervailing interests, beginning with Chinese and then considering U.S. countervailing
interests.
A.

Chinese CountervailingInterests RegardingAltruistic Investment

Earlier, the Article briefly noted the opinion of one Chinese
scholar who candidly admitted the unlikelihood that a true, independent sector will emerge in China because organizations that
traditionally comprise the independent sector contain "threatening elements." An understanding of the phrase "independent sector" as that phrase is used in Western society, explains much of the
apparent Chinese antipathy against Western-style altruistic organizations. The phrase implies that society may be divided into distinct sectors, one of which, the "independent sector," is populated
by charities and other nonprofit organizations. The independent
sector is loyal to no particular authority or philosophy except the
accomplishment of "good works" and the diffusion and decentralization of authority. 20 9 The other two sectors, government and business, compete with each other and with the independent sector for
influence in the tripartite society. 210 For reasons related to the
monopolization and maintenance of power, the governmental sector seeks (but rarely attains) total allegiance and reacts suspiciously
and defensively to criticism, whether implicit or explicit. The governmental sector pursues its own social theory, however just or
unjust that theory may seem to those outside of the governmental
sector. Authoritative governments attack, discredit and destroy
social theories that are not in accord with their own, and just as
often attacks methodologies that are not in accord with their own.
209. The unique culture that resulted from America's principles of free association and pluralism shaped a fresh new spirit of philanthropy markedly different
than that of other contemporary single-sector societies dominated by Crown or
Church. Philanthropy has continued to play a vigorous role as change-agent and
risk-taker in American society. Because it is neither beholden to an electorate nor
driven by shareholders, the American philanthropic sector has been free to
experiment and innovate in ways that government and business dare not.
Lieber, supra note 2. Chinese scholars, too, recognize the tripartite nature of capitalist
society: "Hence, it is increasingly obvious in China that a NGO sector is inevitably needed
in addition to the enterprise sector, which is profit-oriented, and the government sector,
which is power driven." Zhao, supra note 55.
210. Lieber, supra note 2, at 737 (noting the distinct boundaries between the three
sectors of society).
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The business sector, however, is entirely amoral. Despite its commercial speech to the contrary, the business sector is unconcerned
with anything other than the pursuit of profit. It adheres to a "winner takes all" ethic and thus is viewed sometimes as a threat to the
governmental sector and, at other times, as a necessary compliment to that sector. In either event, the business sector can be
"bought" by any bidder willing to assist in the sector's pursuit of
profit.
The independent sector considers itself morally superior to the
other sectors. Participants in the independent sector decry the
mad pursuit of profit that ultimately benefits, or seems to benefit,
only a few winners. 2 11 Ironically, the independent sector seeks the
sort of Utopia that China previously sought via the iron rice bowl.
The independent sector is more similar to the governmental sector
than to the business sector. Despite any similarities, though, the
independent sector is nonetheless fiercely independent 2 12 and it
disdains the very essential characteristics of government, which are
the concentration of power and the standardization of methodology. 2 13 The independent sector is instead governed by principled
expediency and particularized methodology with regard to the
accomplishment of goals that are sometimes consistent with government goals. The independent sector is, almost by definition,
invariably critical of government methodology, 2 14 especially insofar
as the allocation of power and influence within society are
concerned.
Because the business sector is amoral, it should come as no surprise that it might align itself with whatever other sector is most
likely to further the goal of profit seeking. 21 5 Despite occasional
examples to the contrary, it is more efficient for the business sector
211. One example of an organization that does so is Global Exchange, whose website
at http://www.globalexchange.org contains position statements against the WTO and
global capitalism.
212. "The Third Sector was said to be inhabited by a congeries of tribes who acknowledged fealty to neither Caesar nor the Invisible Hand, who were accountable in neither
arena of politics nor the marketplace of economics." Atkinson, supra note 1, at 503.
213. Id.
214. The nine essential functions of the nonprofit sector are: (1) initiating new ideas
and processes; (2) developing public policy; (3) supporting minority or local interests; (4)
providing services that the government cannot constitutionally provide; (5) overseeing government; (6) overseeing the marketplace; (7) bring the business and government sector
together; (8) furthering active citizenship; and (9) giving aid abroad. Lieber, supra note 2,
at 737.
215. A concrete example with regard to the U.S. business sector's amoral interaction
with the Chinese government is contained in U.S.

-

CHINA SEcuIT'v REVIEW COMMISSION,

supra note 16, at 9-11 (discussing U.S. business' willingness to transfer sensitive technology
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to become an ally, rather than an adversary of government and
thus, business may direct funds to incumbents in hopes of maintaining or creating friendly relations with government. The business sector may submit to and even champion government when
doing so is most consistent with its amoral purpose. In less authoritative mature market societies, such as the United States, the business sector may even capture government to some degree by
investing funds sufficient to control incumbents. On the other
hand, through the forcible and discriminatory application of its
regulatory power, the government sector can make the business
sector so dependent upon the government that the business sector
no longer actually competes with government but is instead a tool
of government. Observers have speculated that this is precisely the
approach China has taken in its transition process. Rather than
adopting the Central and Eastern European "big bang" approach,
whereby government simply withdraws its regulatory hand almost
overnight,216 the Chinese government has adopted a more gradualist approach through which it undertakes a much slower withdrawal from public life, and then only in incremental steps to
ensure that the business sector never constitutes or encourages
threats to the government's political authority. 217 For highly centralized, authoritative governments, implicit or explicit criticisms
and challenge are threatening. 2 18 Less centralized governments
with diffused powers, such as the United States, normally react to
the criticisms inherent in the existence of an independent sector
by incorporating, co-opting, encouraging, or logically rejecting the

with military capability in order to gain access to the Chinese market and without regard to
U.S. national interests).
216. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
217. Indeed, China's constitution sounds quite paternalistic with regard to the business
sector. "The State guides, helps, and supervises the individual economy by exercising
administrative control." CHINESE CONST. ch. I, art. 1;see a/soJoseph Kahn, China's Communist Party, 'to Survive,' Opens Its Doors to Capitalists,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at A10 (noting
that although the market is gaining clout in China, it is doing so only under the close
supervision of the Communist Party).
218. A number of provisions in the Chinese Constitution indicate intolerance for criticism or dissent. For example, Chapter I, Article I: "The socialist system is the basic system
of the People's Republic of China. Sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or
individual is prohibited." CHINESE CONST. ch. 1, art. 1. Another states, "The state maintains
public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities .... " Id.
ch. I, art. 28. Still another provision states, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China, in
exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of
society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." Id.
ch. II, art. 51.
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2 19
goals or methodology advocated by an independent sector.
Authoritative governments respond by simply attacking and seeking to eliminate what is viewed as a source of competition. 22 0 And
there are even occasions when even a decentralized, less authoritative government will feel threatened enough that it will actively

seek the destruction of competition. 2 21 Gradualism, though, would

not address the threat inherent in the presence of an independent
sector. Regardless of how gradual the Chinese government's nurturance of a truly independent sector may be, such a sector will still
bring with it "threatening elements" because those elements-diffusion of power and freedoms of speech, association and beliefdefine the very nature of independent sector inhabitants. A gradualist approach to the independent sector will therefore not be

effective in creating a subordinate ally in a truly independent sector, as is apparently occurring with regard to the Chinese business
sector. 222 The presence of even a gradually emerging independent
sector necessarily represents implicit and explicit criticism of gov219. "Nations with a vibrant civil society have produced more effective and accountable
public institutions." See SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STAFF OF THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANKCIVIL SOCIETY COLLABORATION - PROGRESS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001 (2002),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSIBankServlet?pcont=details&
eid=000160016_20031107153808. In extreme cases, of course, even less authoritative governments react defensively to the very presence of altruistic organizations. For example,
under authority of Executive Order 13,224, the United States has taken action to shut
down charities (and other organizations) it believes advocates, supports or is connected
with anti-American terrorism. Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see
also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF TERRORISTS AND GROUPS
IDENTIFIED

UNDER

EXECUTIVE

ORDER

13,224,

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/

6531.htm (last visited, Jan. 18, 2004) (listing organizations such as the Holy Land Foundation); Glenn R. Simpson, Tracingthe Money, TerrorInvestigators Run Into Mr. Qadi,WALL ST.
J., Nov. 6, 2002, at Al (regarding the U.S. legal attack on Islamic charities such as the
Quranic Literacy Institute and the International Relief Organization, both of which are
recognized as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) and are allegedly associated with Yasin
al-Qadi, a person listed as a terrorist under Executive Order 13,224).
220. The diffusion of power and influence within society is particularly anathema to
what one scholar refers to as China's "Democratic Centralism." OGDEN, supra note 41, at
135. Such a system is premised upon "unity and acceptance of party policy being achieved
by guided discussion" amongst small groups of citizens. Id.
221. A fascinating example of the U.S. executive branch fearing and attacking the very
presence of an altruistic organization is contained in Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v.
Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.C. Cir. 1973). That case gives a glimpse into the Nixon Administration's blatant but clumsy efforts to deny tax exemption to a charitable organization that
it viewed as acting in opposition to the Presidents' constituencies.
222. "The Chinese leadership has seemingly developed a far greater tolerance for market forces of supply and demand, which challenge communist ideology, than for Western
values that might pollute Chinese culture. Outside the economic realm, the appeal of
Western models and values is limited by the central leadership's concern for protecting
China's Chineseness." OGDEN, supra note 41, at 7.
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ernment's failure to provide for the entire needs of society or the
methods by which government seeks to influence its population.
Criticism, no matter how legitimate and slowly emerging, is nevertheless threatening to authoritative governments.
The existence of an independent sector represents many ideals
of Western democratic society. Western style independent sectors
implicitly advocate the superiority of a society that believes in the
sharing and diffusion of power, freedoms of speech, belief, dissent,
and association. 223 Observers, however, have noted that China
seeks both economic democracy and also concentrated and centralized governmental power. 22 4 China's gradual approach to transitioning from a planned to a market economy is motivated by a
metaphorical desire to have its cake and eat it too. 225 Some economists believe that a market economy can truly exist only within the
context of a democratic political society and that, inevitably,
China's strategy will fail. 226 China's twenty-year transition process
2 27
challenge's that conventional wisdom.
China refers to its new economic order as "market socialism" or
"socialism with Chinese characteristics."' 228 The existence of a truly
independent sector is either completely anathema to market socialism or at least much more threatening to market socialism than is
the existence of a relatively unregulated, but closely supervised,
business sector. The threat exists because the independent sector,

223. In early Twentieth Century China (i.e., around 1911), "organizing social groups
became a major activity of political advocacy forces, through which progressive intellectuals
disseminated Western democratic ideas and sought ways to bring about social transformation." CHUNYING & YE, supra note 54, at 86.

224. SeeJoseph Kahn, China's Communist Party, 'to Survive,' Opens Its Doors to Capitalists,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at A10 (discussing the Chinese Communist Party's goal of maintaining control over Chinese society while also introducing capitalism).
225. Immediately after the CCP gained power it China, it declared that Chinese citizens had the right of free association. At the same time, however, it stated that all "counterrevolutionary" activities must be suppressed. The latter declaration formed the basis for the
complete elimination of western style altruistic organizations in China by 1958. CHUNYING;
& YE, supra note 54, at 86, 88.
226. See generally Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant
PrivatizationModel, 21 BROOKLYNJ. IN-T'L L. 97 (1995) (discussing China's challenge to the
notion that democracy invariably follows economic reform).
227. "It is of the utmost importance to maintain a stable political environment and
public order .... We must uphold the leadership of the Party . . . eliminate all factors
jeopardizing stability, and guard against . . . subversive . . . domestic hostile forces." Blu-

mental, supra note 9, at 216 (quoting former Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin).
228. See Hardt, supra note 87, at VII (referring to "a unique mixture of central planning and market forces, referred to as 'socialist system with Chinese characteristics").
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idealized, represents an alternative sovereign 2 29 that answers to discovered moral principle - the environment is to be protected at all
costs, profits should give way to affordable housing, or social order
does not justify the death penalty, to name a few such principles.
The independent sector cannot be "bought out" the way business
eventually will; it seemingly has no ultimate goal for which it will
trade its critical and alternative nature. China might successfully
incorporate Western economic theory and still maintain its present
governmental structure, that is, China may indeed achieve market
socialism - by allowing for the gradual emergence of a business
sector while also maintaining its present form of government. It is
unlikely, however, that China can maintain a centralized authoritative government alongside a Western-style independent sector.
Consider three examples that demonstrate the above hypothesis
in a pragmatic fashion. As part of its transition to a market economy, China is required to implement transparent rules and regulations to govern economic relationships. 230 In accord with that
requirement and with the support of foreign economic investment,
China has opened its service markets to foreign participants,
including foreign business law firms. Foreign law firms, of course,
assist in attracting foreign economic investment while presenting
no threat to the government's monopoly on power. But what if a
foreign public interest law firm sought entry into China? Such a
law firm might exist not to participate in the market economy but,
for example, to provide legal defense to those who protest against
the hukou system; such a firm might involve itself in labor movements. It might simply participate in the Chinese criminal system,
advocating on a case-by-case basis for constitutional change. In any
event, such a firm's very existence would represent both a criticism
and a challenge to the governmental sector and, indirectly, to the
business sector. Contemporary and more obvious examples
include the 1989 student democracy protests in Tiananmen

229. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CoRe. L. 585 (1998) (conceptualizing the independent sector as a "separate
sovereign); Lieber, supra note 2, at 738, n.33 (discussing civil society as a political concept).
230. See supra note 97.
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Square 23' and the ongoing Falun Gong movement. 232 The former
involved an explicit criticism of and threat to the government's
power monopoly, 233 while the latter manifests an implicit but
apparently no less dangerous threat to that monopoly. Both epitomize characteristics most often associated with Western style independent sectors including diffusion of power, free speech and
association, critical dissent, and freedom of belief. The Falun
Gong is the more useful example for present purposes because
Falun Gong involves a type of independent sector entity that
expresses neither explicit criticism nor a threat to the government,
and yet the Chinese government's reaction is hardly distinguishable from the suspicious and violently defensive reaction it took in
response to the Tiananmen Square protest. 234 It is as if both the
231. The death of Hu Yaobang [CCP General Secretary and former Youth League
chairman, generally viewed as an economic and political reformist] on April 15,
1989, coupled with growing economic hardship caused by high inflation, provided the backdrop for a large-scale protest movement by students, intellectuals,
and other parts of a disaffected urban population. University students and other
citizens camped out in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to mourn Hu's death and to
protest against those who would slow reform. Their protests, which grew despite
government efforts to contain them called for an end to official corruption and
for defense of freedoms guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution. Protests also
spread to many other cities, including Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. Martial law was declared on May 20, 1989. Late on June 3 and early on the morning of
June 4, military units were brought into Beijing. They used armed force to clear
demonstrators from the streets. There are no official estimates of deaths in Beijing, but most observers believe that casualties numbered in the hundreds.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 6.
232. Falun Gong is a self-improvement movement incapable of easy classification.
Although it is sometimes associated with Buddha and Tao, adherents state that Falun Gong
is not a religion. The simplest explanation would describe Falun Gong as a movement
emphasizing five sets of yoga-type exercises designed to "cultivate" one's mind, body, and
spirit and thereby gain access to one's inner energy. Inner energy is related to energy in
the Universe. Access to that energy, according to adherents, results in increased spiritual
and physical well-being. For a comprehensive description and bibliography, see http://
www.religioustolerance.org/falungong.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
233. "At least in the minds of China's conservative leaders, the anti-CCP statements of
the students, workers, and masses threatened the very foundations of CCP rule." OGnEN,
supra note 41, at 75.
234. The government's response to the Tiananmen Square protests resulted in "hundreds" of casualties. See supra note 231. Its reaction to the Falun Gong movement - one
that is decidedly apolitical - is quite similar:
During the period covered by this report, the Government's respect for freedom
of religion and freedom of conscience worsened, especially for some unregistered
religious groups and spiritual movements such as the Falun Gong. The government intensified its repression of groups that it determined to be "cults" in general, and of the Falun Gong. Various sources report that thousands of Falun
Gong adherents have been arrested, detained, and imprisoned, and that approximately 100 or more Falun Gong adherents have died in detention since 1999....
In July 1999, the Government officially declared Falun Gong illegal and began a
nationwide repression of the movement. Throughout the country, tens of
thousands of practitioners were rounded up and detained for several days - often
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explicitly anti-government Tiananmen Square protest and the
Falun Gong movement represent precisely equivalent threats. The
government's reaction is somewhat generic in the sense that there
are many historical examples of varied governments engaging in
defensive actions with regard to seemingly harmless altruistic activity. 2 3 5 Authoritative governments simply perceive altruistic investment of the sort manifested in Western society as invariably
challenging, if not threatening, to their own self-interests.
The final barrier from a Chinese viewpoint is one that is particular to U.S. altruistic investment. Despite the many instances in
which the Chinese and U.S. governments have engaged in tensionreducing, cooperative endeavors, the Chinese government still
sometimes views and portrays the United States as an aggressive
"hegemon," bent on forcing the international community to conform to U.S. desires. 236 By some accounts, the Chinese government views U.S. international engagements, regardless of how
benevolent a specific engagement may appear to or actually be, as
merely a means to achieve an ultimately hegemonic goal. 237 U.S.
altruistic investment in China therefore presents a very particularized threat to the Chinese governmental sector. Consequently,
U.S. altruistic investors, unlike altruistic investors from other countries, will have to overcome a Trojan horse syndrome of sorts in
order to gain legitimacy in China.
B.

CountervailingInterests of the U.S. Regarding Altruistic Investment

Altruistic investment is not inconsistent with the U.S. governmental sector's preferred economic goals relating to China. It is
in open stadiums under poor and overcrowded conditions with inadequate food,
water, and sanitary facilities. Many Falun Gong practitioners lost their jobs or
were expelled from universities; Falun Gong practitioners continued to experience discrimination in job and educational opportunities. Falun Gong members
who "disrupt public order" or distribute publications can be sentenced to threeseven years and leaders up to seven years or more in prison.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 16, at 122, 130. Other observers estimate the number of detainee deaths at 200. U.S. - CHINA SECuRjTY REVIEW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CHINA: CHAPTER 4, at 8 (2002), available at http://www.uscc.gov/ch4_02.htm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2004).
235. See Lieber, supra note 2, at 739 (noting the explicitly anti-governmental, anti-tyrannical historical roots of the term "civil society").
236. U.S. - CHINA SECuRiTY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 2-3. "Chinese leaders
believe that the fundamental drive of the United States is to maintain global hegemony by
engaging in the shameless pursuit of 'power politics,' often disguised as a quest for democratization." Id. at 3.
237. Id. The report lists the United States' humanitarian intervention in the Balkans as
one example of what China views as hegemony disguised as humanitarian assistance.
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entirely inconsistent, though, with what the United States views as a
possible undesirable political consequences of China's successful
transition. The U.S. governmental sector supports China's transition to a market economy not merely to assist the U.S. business
community, but because it views the market economy as a tool to
achieve political and civil reform in China. Political and civil
reform-to the extent that reform makes China more like the
United States-is considered desirable because such reform would
militate against China aggressively competing for geopolitical
power with the United States. The European experience with market transitions demonstrates that transitions often precede or facilitate the decentralization of authority within society238 and the U.S.
hopes for the same consequence in China. The U.S. governmental
sector acknowledges, though, that economic reform in China
might simply create a wealthier and stronger Chinese governmental sector. The Chinese government's management of the transition process, and particularly its gradualist as opposed to big bang
approach, is designed to achieve that very result. 239 China, according to some observers, would then be a much more aggressive,
stronger and militarily capable geopolitical competitor. 240 Any
investment that furthers that outcome is, of course, inconsistent
with the U.S. governmental sector's goals.
From a different standpoint, altruistic investment in China is
entirely consistent with the immediate goals of the U.S. business
sector, although the U.S. business sector's desired goals do not
necessarily conform to the U.S. governmental sector's goals in
China. Consistent with its characteristic amorality, the U.S. business sector seeks only a stable, ongoing, accessible market from
238. LAviGNE, supra note 11, at 98-99. (providing a chart showing the correlations
between economic and political reform in Central and Eastern Europe during the period
1989 to 1991).
239. "The late Premier Chou's statement to the National People's Congress in January
1975 that China wants to build a powerful modern socialist country by the end of the
century probably encapsulates Chinese Communist objectives in their clearest and most
succinct form." ECKSTEIN, supra note 16, at 278.
240. Exports of capital goods to China, accompanied by foreign technical assistance and partially financed by foreign loans and credits, should . . .support
China's modernization and accelerate the buildup of its economic strength. This
will strengthen the economic foundations for China's military power in the
future. From a long-term perspective, what are the possible implications of this,
not only for China's immediate neighbors but for the major powers that must
deal with it? Should other nations assume that, from the perspective of their
national interests, accelerated economic development in China is desirable and
deserving of support, or should they be concerned about the potential dangers
that a stronger China might pose?
BARNETT, supra note 15, at 256.
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which to draw profits. It is concerned about the concentration of
authority in China, and the relative lack of political and civil freedoms, only insofar as that status quo thwarts its profit-seeking goals.
Earlier the Article noted that business can be bought by any customer willing to assist its pursuit of profit and because the Chinese
government is presently encouraging and assisting the pursuit of
profit, the U.S. business sector has no fundamental complaints
regarding the Chinese government. The U.S. business sector is
thus unconcerned that altruistic investment may indirectly
strengthen, without reforming, Chinese government. In effect, the
business sector has determined that it is more efficient to concede
centralized authority to the Chinese government, provided that
concession results in stable market access. Because altruistic investment assists with the social stability necessary for a market economy, the U.S. business sector should also have no complaints in
regard to such investment.
The U.S. governmental sector, therefore, should logically be of
two minds with regard to altruistic investment in China. First, to
the extent altruistic investment helps China achieve its goal - a
transition to a market economy while also sustaining its present
monopoly on power - it may be viewed as severely counterproductive to U.S. governmental interests. This view holds, though, only if
one assumes away any of the political influences that invariably
accompany the activities of a Western-style independent sector.
Economic investment should strengthen the Chinese government,
even in the absence of accompanying altruistic investment. Altruistic investment can both help and hurt, in roughly equal amounts,
the further strengthening of the State. It will help by eliminating
social welfare hardships that provoke challenge to governmental
authority. Altruistic investment can hurt the Chinese government
because altruistic investors exemplify and practice ideals - diffusion of power, freedom of association, belief, and speech - that
are, at the very least, implicitly inconsistent with authoritative government. 2 41 As a result, altruistic investment could hurt the Chinese government's efforts to maintain centralized authority.
241.

The Chinese Constitution provides:
Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize and make
suggestions to any state organ or functionary. Citizens have the right to make to
relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposure of, any state
organ or functionary for violation of the law or dereliction of duty; but fabrication
or distortion of facts for the purpose of libel or frame-up is prohibited.
* . . No one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposure, or retaliate
against citizens making them.

CHINESE CONST. ch. 2, art. 41.
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Taken together, these positive and negative effects should logically
be viewed as canceling each other out with regard to the secondary
effects concerning the Chinese government. Altruistic investment
should result in neither a net gain nor net loss with regard to the
United States' and China's differing ultimate goals.
The second and more logical view with regard to altruistic investment is that such investment is more consistent than inconsistent
with U.S. governmental goals in China. Altruistic investment is
likely to indirectly strengthen the authoritative nature of China's
government in the short term, but it will also necessarily demonstrate and passively encourage the political and civil reforms
sought by the U.S. government sector and over the long term that
encouragement may result in a more democratic political system.
China seems to accept this second view. This acceptance explains
why China's government has demonstrated so much reticence not
only with regard to the establishment of a true independent sector
domestically, but also with regard to the establishment of a formal
legal basis for the recognition of foreign altruistic investors in
China. In a narrow sense, then, the U.S. governmental sector may
view altruistic investment in China as undesirable. In a more logical and broader sense, altruistic investment in China is consistent
with the U.S. governmental sector's goal, particularly so long as the
U.S. government continues to encourage economic investment.
Amoral economic investment alone is more likely to bring about
the feared result - a stronger, aggressive, militarily capable, geopolitical competitor - than is amoral economic investment coupled
with principled altruistic investment.
VI.

A

PROPOSAL TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL ALTRUISTIC

INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A successful transition to a market economy is the one immediate goal shared by both the United States and China. The two
countries disagree, however, with regard to the intended consequences of that successful transition. The United States hopes that
transition will result in political reform, while China hopes for a
strengthening of the present political system. 242 Both countries
242. China's accession to the WTO carries high stakes for both the United States
and China. While they have some complementary goals for supporting China's
WTO accession - e.g., promoting market-oriented economic growth and reform
- they have very different long-term objectives; the United States seeks a democratic and more open China, while Chinese leadership seeks an economically
strengthened nation that continues to be governed by one-party communist rule.
U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 18.
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therefore have reasons to both encourage and discourage altruistic
investment. On the one hand, altruistic investment will assist the
transition and both countries want transition; but on the other
hand, altruistic investment will either strengthen the Chinese government by dampening discontent caused by the transition or
encouraging political reform. The challenge for both countries,
then, is to employ all means necessary to achieve the economic
goal, while also insuring that those means are neutral with respect
to the divergent political consequences.
The divergence between the intended secondary consequences
is most profound if it is assumed that altruistic investment will flow
primarily from the United States to China. The United States'
form of government, of course, represents the preeminent antithesis of the Chinese form of government. The threat to the Chinese
government is most profound to the extent altruistic investors are
exercising not just Western-style democratic values, but U.S-style
democratic values. Altruistic investment from any source is nonetheless likely to have as much effect on assisting the transition,
never mind the political consequences, as if such investment were
flowing solely from the United States. Thus, altruistic investment
will provide the most assistance to China's economic transition and
be as neutral as possible with regard to the secondary consequences when that investment comes from countries other than
the United States.
The foregoing analysis suggests a potential solution regarding
the need to assist transition without affecting secondary outcomes.
Logically, China should be most receptive to altruistic investment
flowing from countries other than the United States. Non-U.S.
altruistic investment would assist the transition process without
necessarily introducing U.S.-style democratic values in China.
Again, such investment would not be neutral with regard to
strengthening China's present governmental reform, but neither
would anything else that actually assisted the transition process by
dampening social discontent. Meeting social welfare needs,
though doing so is essential to the transition process, will invariably
decrease motivations to challenge the present form of government.
From a U.S. perspective, then, the choice is really only between
assisting and not assisting the transition irrespective of any secondary consequences because China's failure to achieve a market
economy is fraught with as many negative consequences, if not
more, than a successful transition that also strengthens its present
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governmental system. 24 3 A failure to achieve a market economy
would result in China's remaining isolated and defensive with
regard to the global community and it is this isolated and defensive
posture from which conflict becomes more likely. 2 44 A successful
transition, even one that also strengthens the present political
structure, would at least decrease China's isolation and defensiveness. Successful transition would also make it more expensive for
China and the United States to engage in geopolitical conflict. To
the extent China becomes vested in a smoothly functioning global
economy, it is more likely to cultivate friendly and open relations
with the United States and other countries. Non-U.S. altruistic
investment comes closest to achieving the immediate goal shared
by both China and the United States, while also remaining neutral
with respect to negative consequences, or at least not increasing
the chances that what are viewed as negative consequences by
either country will come to fruition.
The solution, then, is that the international community insist
upon a legal framework that would encourage altruistic investment
in China and other developing or transitioning economies. Tax
law and other legal barriers to altruistic investment, identified
above, should be dismantled to the same degree that barriers to
economic investment have been and continue to be systematically
dismantled. With regard to the present problem relating to the
lack of altruistic investment in China, that solution could be
achieved by China's legal recognition of an independent community of altruistic investors, both domestic and foreign. This is particularly necessary because under the present circumstances
Chinese altruistic organizations are actually government auxiliaries
and there are no legal provisions by which foreign altruistic investors may operate in China other than on an ad hoc basis. While
the solution requires that the United States assume a subordinate
role in stimulating altruistic investment, it does not follow that the
United States play no role whatsoever. The United States has a
larger trading imbalance with China than with any other country.
The U.S. trade deficit, the dollar amount by which U.S. imports
from China exceed U.S. exports to China, has grown to almost $90
243. BARNEIT, supra note 15, at 257 (noting that a "strong and secure" China might
also be consistent with U.S. interests because domestic stability will decrease motivations to
mount international challenges).
244. Bhala, supra note 26, at 1476 (noting that not admitting China into the WTO
might isolate China and cause her to "become increasingly hostile to the outside world");
Blumental, supra note 9, at 202-03 (arguing that immediate opening would be "fatal" to
China's enterprises and would cause "severe dislocations" and "massive unemployment").
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billion since China began its transition to a market economy. The
most common explanation is that while China is encouraging U.S.
and other foreign investors to establish export manufacturing platforms in China, it continues to block access to its domestic consumer market. 245 Blocking access to domestic consumer markets,
in turn, is commonly attributed to the desire to protect domestic
jobs, industry, and people from the shock of transition. 246 The barriers are inconsistent with the WTO's goals of free trade, but they
are tolerated on a temporary basis in an effort to lessen the shock
and discontent of transition in developing countries. 2 47 Lessening
shock and discontent is related to the desire to prevent social
upheaval that is likely to occur in, and stimulate resistance to, a
transition economy. 248 Altruistic investment would be a more effi-

cient means of lessening shock and discontent because it would
decrease the need to maintain barriers to a transitioning economy's domestic consumer market and thereby increase the speed
of transition. Hence, if the United States continues to be China's
largest export market, it will also have the highest interest in
encouraging altruistic investment as an efficient replacement for
barriers to China's domestic consumer market. The United States
should pursue this interest not only by encouraging the international community to open the Chinese market to altruistic invest245. During the negotiations leading to China's entry into the WTO, China sought to
be classified as a developing nation so that it would gain the right under GATT to maintain
protectionist barriers for longer periods of time without being subject to counter-measures
from other WT7O members. Bhala, supra note 26, at 1474. The final accession agreement
strikes a compromise by requiring China to phase out its protectionist measures but at a
faster rate than that applicable to developing countries. That compromise originally
appeared in the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China, which agreement eventually became part of China's WTO accession agreement. Id. at 1509-10.
246. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at xvii.
247. "China contends that implementing reforms too quickly would force several Chinese firms into bankruptcy, leading to widespread layoffs and social unrest." Morrison,
supra note 15, at 13.
248. On the other hand, some economists do not believe that a gradualist approach to
transition results in any less economic shock than does a big bang approach:
The gradualist line of thought usually stresses two arguments. The first is obviously that shock [i.e., big bang] therapy cannot apply to structural reforms: one
cannot privatize overnight, even in the most radical give-away schemes; one cannot reform the banking system overnight. The second is that the beneficial outcomes attributed to shock thereby might have been obtained at lesser social costs.
Both arguments are rejected by the 'shock therapists.' Structural transformation
does require time, they admit, but its efficiency is enhanced by quickly conducted
stabilization. Nobody can tell whether the social costs of transformation would
have been lower under an alternative policy, and in any case these costs may be
alleviated by proper compensation schemes.
LAVlGNE, supra note 11, at 153.
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ment but also by eliminating its own domestic disincentives to
altruistic investment in China.
The WTO is the most likely vehicle by which to stimulate altruistic investment in China without violating the assumption that U.S.
altruistic investors should not play a primary role. The United
States cannot effectively pursue or stimulate altruistic investment
on a unilateral or bilateral basis because doing so would be viewed
as a U.S. effort to pursue its own, rather than mutually shared,
goals. Instead, the WTO with U.S. support should encourage international altruistic investment from diverse sources. Tax laws, like
international trading laws, should be harmonized to the extent
possible and taking into account legitimate domestic concerns,
within the international community. It appears that China's
administrative provision allowing for local recognition of foreign
altruistic organizations based on those organizations' home country status seems to meet this need. Yet arbitrary governmental discretion, supported by official but unwritten ideology, means there
are very few instances, if any, in which foreign altruistic organizations are actually recognized on other than an ad hoc basis. The
international community should therefore advocate for the elimination of arbitrary decision-making with regard to the recognition
of altruistic organizations, just as it has with regard to economic
investors and organizations. The WTO is the best candidate for
this process not only because it can be considered neutral with
regard to U.S.-Chinese geopolitical competition, but also because
altruistic investment is conducive to the goal of creating a singular,
unhindered global market economy, which is the goal pursued by
249
the WTO.
Unfortunately, the WTO reflects the same ambivalent attitude of
China and the United States (and no doubt other countries) with
regard to altruistic investment. That ambivalence is skewed in the
direction of less international altruistic investment rather than
more.2 50 Officially, at least, the WTO completely ignores, or intentionally excludes, the potential beneficial effect altruistic invest249. Of course, the WTO needed China almost as much as China needed the WTO.
Without China's participation, the "ATO could be criticized as not be truly representative
of the "world." Blumental, supra note 9, at 203.
250. Although the institutions, funding streams and volunteer reserves of civil
society are internationalizing, the laws that control it are still overwhelmingly
domestic. In other areas of international private tax and business law, geographic
barriers are being dismantled; in the area of transnational civil society, however,
the laws remain landlocked. Few coherent legal principles apply cross-border or
from country to country. Few legal standards or norms transcend their borders.
Lieber, supra note 2, at 740.
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ment may bring about in transitioning the world to a singular
global market economy. 2 1 The starkest example of this behavior is
evident in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).252
That multilateral WTO agreement is designed to open signatories'
domestic markets to foreign service vendors. The elimination of
barriers to foreign entry is accomplished primarily by the mandate
that signatories apply to foreign service-providers within their
respective jurisdictions the same laws and regulations as are applicable to their domestic service providers. 253 Signatories may not
discriminate against foreign service-providers and services covered
by the agreement include those from all economic sectors. 254 Significantly, "services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority" are excluded, 255 thus permitting signatories to continue
to block access to their domestic markets with regard to such services. More significantly, "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" are defined as "any service which is supplied

neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or
more service suppliers." 25 6 Readers familiar with the U.S. tax rules
relating to the nonprofit sector will immediately recognize the similarity of that definition to the legal doctrines, however amorphous
they may be, that define organizations entitled to charitable tax
exemption under the U.S. tax code. 257 In its most official legal
pronouncements, then, the WTO actually ignores or excludes the
possibility that cross-border altruistic investment ought to be stimulated and barriers thereto dismantled as part of the effort to create
a free-flowing global market economy.
Even when the WTO recognizes the relevance of altruistic investment, it does so in a tentative, even half-hearted manner. For
example, its organizing document (Marakeesh Agreement) con251. The Marrakesh Agreement states: "The General Council may make appropriate
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO." WTO Agreement, supra note 94, art. V,
2. However, the General Council later opined that "there is currently a broadly held view
that it would not be possible for NGO's to be directly involved in the work of the IATo or
its meetings." WAORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR ARRANGEMENTS ON RELATIONS
WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/
english/forums-e/ngoe/guidee.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
252. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter
GATS]. GATS comprises Annex IB of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.
253. Id. arts. II, XVII.
254. Id. arts. 1.3(b).
255. Id.
256. Id. art. 1.3.(c).
257. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
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tains an explicit declaration that the WTO may consult and cooperate with nongovernmental organizations "concerned with matters
relating to those of the WTO." 258 In a later pronouncement, the
WTO limited the role of altruistic investors to one of merely generating greater awareness and encouraging greater transparency with
regard to WTO economic activities and policies. The pronouncement states that the WTO would make its official documents and
publications accessible to the public and to non-governmental
organizations in particular. Most telling, is the pronouncement's
conclusion that "there is currently a broadly held view that it would
not be possible for NGO's to be directly involved in the work of the
WTO or its meetings." 259 The statement does not address the feasibility of WTO members entering into agreements and undertaking
formal activities designed to decrease the barriers to international
altruistic investment, just as they do with regard to economic
investment. Instead, the WTO seems to take exactly the opposite
approach by specifically excluding altruistic investors as direct beneficiaries of agreements designed to dismantle barriers to international trade and access.
GATS' use of the phrase "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" is illuminating because it suggests that WTO
members view altruistic investments as somehow encroaching upon
government's exclusive domain. 260 Earlier, the Article posited that
the independent sector is inherently critical and challenging to the
governmental sector. The WTO's exclusion of altruistic investment from its agreements designed to eliminate international barriers is confirmation that most governmental sectors are suspicious
and defensive with regard to the independent sector.
There remain several reasons as to why the United States should
push for greater inclusion of altruistic investment in WTO policies
designed to bring about a global market economy transition. Pre258. See supra note 251.
259. Id.
260. In a speech before a group of non-governmental organizations from around the
world, Deputy General Secretary Mike Moore stated:
Our owners [i.e., WTO members] jealously defend their rights and prerogatives.
Even having these symposia [with NGO's] is controversial and not universally supported. Let me share why. Many Ministers and Ambassadors say it is not thejob of
the WTO to embrace NGO's and civil society. They say that should be done at the
national level in the formation of national policy positions. They are correct but
only 90% correct.
Mike Moore, Open Societies, Freedom, Development and Trade, Address Before the Plenary Opening NAITO Symposium on Issues Confronting the World Trading System (July 6,
2001)
(transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/spmme/
spmm67_e.htm) (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
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vious Sections provide discussions of two primary reasons, increasing the speed with which transition economies such as China
dismantle barriers to domestic markets and lessening the shock
and discontent suffered by a population undergoing transition.
Both of those effects of altruistic investments raise the chances that
the market economy will succeed. Other reasons include lessening
the need for China and indeed other transition governments to
provide social services and thereby reducing hidden subsidies,
taxes, and various costs derived from or imposed on market investors, including foreign investors who will remain at a competitive
disadvantage even in a completely open market.2 61 Another reason
is that WTO members are essentially correct in viewing the independent sector as inherently critical and challenging of government and this conception should encourage inclusion. In the
United States, for example, ongoing criticisms and challenges are
viewed as essential for good government. Altruistic investors are
valued, at least in part, precisely because the criticisms and challenges inherent in their activities are viewed as constructive, not
destructive. Thus, the United States should logically conclude that
foreign transition governments might be made better (i.e., more
like the U.S. government, to be quite honest and perhaps somewhat ethnocentric) by the presence of a barrier-free international
market for altruistic investors. Moreover, the United States is in a
particularly "high road" position with regard to dismantling barriers to international altruistic investment. Non-U.S. altruistic organizations are presently free to register and operate in the United
States just as are U.S. altruistic investors. 26 2 Many foreign based
charities present implicit or explicit challenges and criticisms to
U.S. governmental policy and yet those charities are permitted to
exist under the protection of U.S. law. For these reasons, the
United States has the moral authority to encourage and advocate
that China and other transition countries provide the same degree
of openness with regard to U.S. altruistic investors in their
jurisdictions.
A final, very brief case study regarding the World Bank confirms
the arguments presented in this Article. The World Bank is a
membership organization owned by 184 member countries, includ261. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at 54-57 (discussing the use of implicit subsidies
to protect state run enterprises).
262. The recent enactment of I.R.C. § 501(p) (2003), which grants authority to the IRS
to revoke the tax exempt status of charities believed to be supporting "terrorism," signals a
retrenchment of the previous openness with which the United States welcomed foreign
nonprofit organizations.
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ing the United States and China. 263 The Bank can be viewed, consistent with the perspective and terminology presented in this
Article, as a mutual fund for altruistic investment. Essentially, it
provides development assistance through market and below-market loans and other "concessional assistance" to developing countries. The Bank's fundamental goal is the eradication of poverty
via economic development. The intended investment yield for
member countries and other suppliers of altruistic capital is obviously one that occurs as market economies are encouraged and
sustained in developing nations. The Bank has placed its religiouslike faith, essentially, in the market apparatus as a means to achieve
the social goals that are also sought by altruistic investment. At the
same time, the Bank has explicitly concluded that altruistic investment must play a direct and indispensable role in economic development if that development is to achieve social goals. Accordingly,
the Bank maintains a formal program designed to ensure the
involvement of altruistic investors in the consultative, deliberative,
prioritizing, implementation, and appraisal process leading to the
use of its funds in developing countries. 264
Unlike their role in the WTO, altruistic investors involved with
the World Bank are encouraged and allowed to have as much
input into the ultimate social goals as are the government and business sectors of developing countries. 265 Clearly, that policy of
inclusion is furthered by the presence of remote altruistic investors, that is, passive altruistic investors who provide capital to be
used in developing countries but who are not involved in implementing strategies funded by their capital. The process is more
efficient and effective, however, when altruistic investment is made
or managed by groups that are actually resident in the developing
country. For this reason, the World Bank has explicitly championed "enabling environments" in developing countries. 266 The
phrase, "enabling environment" refers to an appropriate legal, fiscal, political, informational and institutional environment in which
altruistic organizations can thrive. 26 7 As has been previously dis263. The general summary of the World Bank, its mission and goals is taken from the
Bank's website at http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
264. See SocIAL DEVELOPMENT STAFF OF THE WVORLD BANK, supra note 219.
265. See id. at 4-6.
266. See id. at 7, 26-27.
267. Legal reform is an essential and required characteristic of China's transition to a
market economy, but most commentators ignore the role of law as it relates to altruistic
investment in a transitioning economy. Nevertheless, the same considerations that relate to
legal reform in a market economy also apply to altruistic investment:
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cussed, China lacks any real legal or fiscal policy that could
remotely be described as an enabling environment. 268 Indeed, this
might be confirmed by two startling statistics. In 2000 and 2001,
the World Bank worked with altruistic organizations to approve
and fund forty-three Country Assistance Strategies designed to
achieve social welfare goals around the world. None of those strategies involved China. 269 Likewise, the World Bank worked with
altruistic investors to develop and fund Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers in forty countries and China was, again, conspicuously
absent from the list of countries. 270 These exclusions do not mean
that China has failed to implement development policies funded
by the World Bank. To the contrary, China continues to be a huge
beneficiary of World Bank funds but primarily via economic rather
than altruistic investments from the World Bank. 27 I The statistics
clearly suggest, though, that altruistic organizations are largely
absent from China. The status quo, therefore, would benefit from
a sustained effort by China, the United States and the international
community to create the sort of enabling environment contemplated by the World Bank.
VII.

CONCLUSION

All that is lacking with regard to increasing international altruistic investment in China is an understanding of the positive and
integral role altruistic investment may have in the Chinese transiRegulatory reform in a transition economy is not essentially a deregulatory task,
but a mix of new regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation, backed up by legal
and institutional reforms, to support increasingly competitive markets. Pro-market regimes are composed of economy-wide policies (such as commercial law,
competition law, consumer protection, and corporate governance) and sectorspecific policies (such as banking and telecommunications regulatory regimes),
operating within the rule of law.
OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 46, at 364. A legal regime relating to
altruistic investors and the independent sector would fall within both categories - economy
wide and sector-specific policies.
268. "The legal system is unsound. Regulations for running non-profit organizations
are not yet perfected. A disconnect exists between policies and regulations and the objective, practical requirements. The legal system is lagging behind and that definitely affects
the smooth development of China's NGO's." Chen, supra note 144.
269.

See SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STAFF OF THE WORLD BANK, supra note 219, at 30-34.

270.
271.

See id. at 35-39.
The World Bank has invested about $35 million in China on over 234 projects,

about half of which are still being implemented. THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND

available at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/a71f97484cde
7250852567c900767289/2ac5444a2002378e852567c90076824b?OpenDocument(last visited
Nov. 19, 2000). If the years 2000 and 2001 are any indication, none of the investments
(admittedly for infrastructure, health and education, and other social welfare purposes)
were spent with the influence of altruistic investors.
CHINA: COUNTRY BRIEF,
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tion economy. Neither the United States, China, nor the international community (for which the WTO is merely one
representative) demonstrate sufficient awareness of altruistic
investment as a beneficial factor in a transition economy. Altruistic
investment, stimulated by tax benefits, can create positive results by
filling the social welfare vacuum created by a State's sudden or
even gradual withdrawal from its role as omnipotent provider of
the social welfare. It can hasten transition by lessening the need or
justification for transition governments to maintain barriers to
their own domestic consumer markets while also exploiting the
consumer markets of trading partners. Just as explicit economic
competition can enhance the marketplace, the implicit competition of altruistic investors can enhance government.
Perhaps China and the United States ignore altruistic investment
because its effect is easily minimized. Providing food and shelter,
for example, to a few families suffering in a transition economy
that impacts millions might be deemed insignificant, but so too
might the establishment of a single new corporation that would
have an insignificant impact when viewed in isolation. There persists a certain faith that the birth of a new commercial corporation
will ultimately lead to benefits for the millions of citizens toiling
away in a transition economy. At the same time, history shows that
there are inevitable losers in a market economy, particularly during
a transition period. It is therefore unlikely that a market economy
will develop successfully in the absence of altruistic investors.
There has always been an accompanying faith that the harshness
and amorality of capitalist economies can and ought to be alleviated by altruistic investment. That faith should be no less applicable in the most populated country in the world.

